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This essay has occupied me on and off for over a decade. Parts III, IV, and VI were presented at
the 1982 Annual Meeting, Law and Society Association, Toronto, Canada, June 3-6, 1982 and, in a
later version, at the Interdisciplinary Legal Studies Colloquium, University of Wisconsin School of
Law, March 19, 1984. A much earlier version of Part VII was given as a Harris Lecture at Indiana
University Law School, Bloomington, Indiana, April 9, 1986. A Rutgers Law School faculty colloquium in October 1988 saw Parts I and III-VII. If I had anticipated such a long gestation, I might
have done a better job keeping track of the suggestions made to me; I hope that my many critics over
the years will recognize the pains I have taken with their suggestions, even when I have misplaced
the source.
Special thanks go to Karl Klare, who introduced into law schools the interpretive approach to
law; who encouraged me in this project even after large-scale inquiry into the social processes of legal
change had become unfashionable within the Conference on Critical Legal Studies; and whose encouragement did not flag even after I became critical of some of Karl's models of legitimation and
attempted alternative approaches. No one picking a model, a foil, or a friend could have been luckier
than I have been.
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theory of labor legislation which I propose suggests that sweeping legislative reforms of labor law are ritual events whose significance, and a high significance it is, are cultural and symbolic. Labor
legislation is a highly public ceremony which enacts an idealized picture
of a culture's industrial power relations. In advanced, Western economies, such legislation is most frequently a concession to a union movement or working class which is making trouble, by a government forced
by political circumstances to make some gesture showing workers' inclusion in the nation's political life. Labor legislation is designed to restore
order by creating-not simulating-a cognitive experience-typically, an
experience of victory-for working people.
People who legislate anticipate that legislation will educate, permitting working people or employers to grasp cognitively a particular system of values or power relations. This function of ritual has been wellHE
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studied by anthropologists and is in accord with what we know about
cognitive elements in the formation of social values.
The theory thus potentially explains the timing of labor legislation,
the social forces leading to its enactment, and some features of its content; namely, the propensity of labor legislation in particular to concern
itself heavily with declarations of rights and other matters not amenable
to easy enforcement. This Article does not prove the theory. The Article
is limited to a survey of large-scale facts which could not, even in principle, demonstrate that mine is the best interpretation of the process of
labor legislation. Such demonstration would require smaller-scale, anthropological research that has not been done. Nevertheless, the theory is
offered in its present form in the hope of directing attention to the symbolic aspects of law, in enriching our models of the legislative process,
and in enriching debate about the strategic possibilities for the international labor movement.
I.

INTRODUCTION: A FEW WORDS ABOUT LAW
AS SYMBOLIC POLITICS

Before developing the theory proper, a few words are necessary to
explain the claim that law plays a "symbolic" role. Experience in oral

presentation of this work has taught me that communication difficulties
set in at this point. By so describing law's functions I do not mean in any
way to suggest that these are unimportant, illusory, or to be contrasted
with a "real world" of "real politics," altogether elsewhere.' I am neither
attacking nor pitying workers who achieve "symbolic" gains. I do mean
to ally myself with an explosion of interest in symbolic behavior which
has swept the social sciences over the past two decades and whose wellnigh inevitable rush into the law schools this Article aims to facilitate. 2
Although our law reviews concern themselves little with them, it is
not difficult to find examples of intense battles for legislative or other
1. This is the usage in M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964), which sets up
throughout a basic distinction between a "real" world of politics, in which organized insiders play
for money and power, and a "mass culture" in which passive spectators are served symbolic theater
for their delectation. The distinction is played out in slightly different terms in each chapter: while
the elite uses "referential" symbols to assist their thinking in an economical fashion, the masses are
befuddled by "condensation" symbols which evoke "emotions" and into which they pour their own
anxieties, Id. at 6; and so on.
This Article is in part an attack on this distinction, not an appropriation of it.
2. The breach in the floodgates is unquestionably Robert Gordon's magnificent pair of articles,
themselves a major theoretical contribution to the school: Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories,36 STAN.
L. REV. 57 (1984) and Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981) [hereinafter Gordon articles].
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legal change in which the participants seem to be playing for no behavioral gain whatever. A vivid recent example was the congressional legislation-but not a constitutional amendment-banning flag burning, in
response to the Supreme Court decision protecting it as speech.3 No one
supporting the Supreme Court's decision, or any version of the legislative
response, could have supposed that either would have significant behavioral consequences, if the behavior in question is "burning the flag."
Another such battle without immediate behavioral consequences
concerns a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in public schools.
One surreal aspect of the debate is that prayer is already endemic in the
public schools. The impact of the relevant Supreme Court cases has been
studied as extensively as any other, and while there were school districts
that complied with them, compliance was spotty and largely in response
to local political factors.4 Certainly many school districts continue to begin each day with required prayer, as both the scholars, and the steady
stream of lawsuits by the American Civil Liberties Union and other organizations, demonstrate.5
From the perspective of a behaviorist, for example a scholar in the
law-and-economics movement, advocates of flag burning legislation, or
advocates of school prayer such as Jerry Falwell or Pat Boone, are acting
irrationally. Advocates of school prayer know that they will not succeed
in a constitutional amendment requiring prayer in unwilling districts. If I
am right, that through local political pressure Falwell and Boone can
already effectuate almost as much prayer as even they want, why do they
want a constitutional amendment?
Even if the behavioral consequences are negligible or unclear, I do
not think advocates of a constitutional amendment on flag burning or
school prayer are irrational. The questions involved may not, however,
be behavioral at all, at least not in any simple sense involving aggregate
flags burned or prayers prayed. Rather, the questions involve the statement and definition of cultural values, in which the law occupies a sym3. Flag Protection Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 777 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 700); Texas v, Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989).
4. K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY
To LOCAL PRACTICES (1971). The decisions are Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abington
School Dist. v. Scbempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F.Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); Karen B. v.
Treen, 455 U.S. 913 (1982), aff'g 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981); Collins v. Chandler Unified School
Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981). It certainly seems possible that there
were school districts which had not conducted prayer at all before 1962 but which bent to political
pressure to introduce such prayer following the salience of the Supreme Court decisions.
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bolic role. From this perspective, the debates about these proposed
amendments are dramatic moments in which our culture asks itself hard
questions: who are we anyway? What kind of country do we have? What
kind of public order? The debate also addresses some less normative
questions. Who's in charge here?6
Another recent example of a campaign for legal change substantially
motivated by similar questions of cultural definition was the campaign
for and against the Equal Rights Amendment. Of course, when Congress
first approved the Amendment, the Supreme Court had yet to find any
sex discrimination unconstitutional. But as the long state ratification
campaign dragged on, accompanied by a steady flow of sex discrimination litigation, it became harder and harder to say, purely as a technical
legal matter, what the Amendment would have accomplished.7 Nevertheless, opponents of the Amendment did not rejoice at its apparent otiosity; just as proponents refrained from claiming that their goals were
achieved. Instead, of course, the battle for a symbolic statement both of
power relations and of cultural values intensified, at the same rate that
less and less remained at stake in terms of legal doctrine. The inevitable
denouement was that after the Amendment was finally defeated, the
Supreme Court upheld draft registration limited to men: the first
Supreme Court decision that might possibly have come out the other way
under the Equal Rights Amendment.' One imagines a strict behaviorist
exclaiming that for the first time he understands what the debate was
about: the ERA was a demand that women be forced to register for the
draft. We would be justified in thinking that the behaviorist had missed
the point.
This Article explores an alternative approach: that battles over law
are, enough of the time to matter, battles over cultural definition. This is
true not only for obviously "symbolic legislation" such as a school prayer
6, This question was suggested by Clifford Geertz's interpretation of Balinese treaties in the
19th Century in C. GEERTZ, NEGARA: THE THEATRE STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BALI 4144 (1980). The "treaties seem to have been designed more to codify the pretexts upon which alliances
could be broken than to establish the bases upon which they could be built." Id. at 43. Nevertheless,
"One thing that the treaties did do was to define in public terms who the official players in this
superordinate game were ....
Id. at 42.
7. Accord, J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOsT THE ERA 2 (1986).
8. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). These remarks are meant to be suggestive, not
indisputable. For an argument that an ERA would matter in doctrinal terms, by facilitating attacks
on facially neutral laws with discriminatory impact, see Segal, Sexual Equality, The Equal Protection
Clause, and the ERA, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 85 (1984). Perhaps an ERA would have this effect,
though of course the Fourteenth Amendment does not, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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amendment, but for something as grubby as labor legislation. The Article suggests that the timing of labor legislation is shaped by the needs of
governing elites for symbolic definition of labor's place in society. A frequent but not exclusive occasion for this definition is an unexpected increase in the quantity or intensity of industrial unrest. The Article
suggests that the content of labor legislation is shaped by the desire of
legislators to have the legislation function effectively as such a symbolic
statement. Finally, the specialized process of labor legislation counts as a
"ritual" in anthropological terms.
Before developing the model, however, I would like to develop three
relevant anthropological conceptions. Here are two not-randomly selected extracts from the work of two anthropologists who have given this
Article its definitions of "symbolic action" and "ritual." This will introduce three aspects of my model of labor law: labor law is symbolic in the
sense of being consciously concerned with supplying concepts and images
through which industrial actors may grasp cognitively their system; it is
ritualistic in the sense of being accompanied by various unusual devices
to heighten its public salience and impact; it achieves its effect through
metaphor.
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz is a sort of guru to the new interest in symbolic behavior in the social sciences, and his influence lies
heavy on the pages that follow. As an introduction, let us examine his
1964 essay on ideology, which may justly be termed germinal.9 Geertz
attempts to salvage for social scientists the concept of "ideology," long
debased into a mere pejorative. Geertz's solution is to view "ideology,"
not as an essentially distorted or unsatisfactory way of thinking, but
rather as "symbolic templates" which are simply essential to any sort of
group life. "The function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics
possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful, the suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped." 10
Geertz suggests, quite plausibly, that the formal articulation of ideologies
9.

Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 47 (D. Apter ed.

1964), reprinted in C. GEERTZ,

THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES

193 (1973). Page references

here will be to the latter volume.
10. Id. at 218. This of course is the nub of my rejection of Murray Edelman's formulation in M.
EDELMAN, supra note 1: Edelman does not explain how the "rational" "insiders" can engage in
"real" politics, or even communicate with each other, without a store of culturally supplied symbols
and concepts, which define the crucial political players and permit their demands to be expressed.
This study deals with this latter phenomenon; it is limited to quintessential "insiders" such as trade
union confederations or employer organizations, and asks through what symbols these insiders wage
legal battles.
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should most likely be encountered as received tradition and conventional
behavior weaken: "It is in country unfamiliar emotionally or topographically that one needs poems and road-maps." 1 1 In this way I hope, in the
study which follows, to identify some crisis situations in the industrial
relations of advanced economies, "unfamiliar countries" where traditional behaviors seemed inadequate, in which legislation performed this
"ideological" function of highlighting, publicizing, new concepts and
12
images.
Another influence on this essay has been the work on ritual by the
anthropologist Stanely Jeyaraja Tambiah, who has carried forward a recent current of anthropological thought in decoupling "ritual" from
ideas of religion, or the "primitive." Instead, ritual more universally "attempts to restructure and integrate the minds and emotions of the actors."13 In this study, I will identify certain repetitive patterns of
governmental response to industrial crisis involving stereotyped uses of
legal processes and institutions, which qualify as "rituals" in this sense.
Now what may be of interest to the restive reader of these definitions is that both Geertz and Tambiah, searching for a familiar example
in their reader's culture to illustrate these exotic phenomena, select an
example from the world of labor law. Those examples will illustrate a
final feature of our preliminary model: that legislation of the sort described here works as a ritual because it incorporates the power of
metaphor.
11. C. GEERTZ, supra note 9, at 218.
12. Geertz's essay has indeed been seminal in awakening social science interest, particularly
among anthropologists and historians, in symbolic behavior, which has involved application of the
work of Geertz's pantheon: "such philosophers as Peirce, Wittgenstein, Cassirer, Langer, Ryle, or
Morris [and] such literary critics as Coleridge, Eliot, Burke, Empson, Blackmur, Brooks, or
Auerbach .... Id. at 208. However, it has failed in at least one purpose, inasmuch as the word
"ideology" is probably as much a pejorative today, a quarter of a century on, as it was when Geertz
wrote. If his usage had prevailed, one could without hesitation describe law as "ideological" and not
be understood as sneering. I do not believe one can, so I will try to avoid the word "ideology," which
continues to mean so many things to so many people. In my experience, the word "symbolic" causes
enough problems.
13. S.TAMBIAH, CULTURE, THOUGHT, AND SOCIAL ACTION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 53 (1985). On this view, ritual may be defined as "a culturally constructed system of
symbolic communication. It is constituted of patterned and ordered sequences of words and acts,
often expressed in multiple media, whose content and arrangement are characterized in varying
degree by formality (conventionality), stereotyping (rigidity), condensation (fusion), and redundancy
(repetition)." Id. at 128. I will return to this definition of ritual. Obviously, I use it because it is
handy and suits my purpose. I make no pretense of canvassing all the things that anthropologists
have meant by "ritual" or sorting out who is responsible for various steps along the road to
decoupling "ritual" from the sacred and universalizing the concept. A brief introduction is D.
KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER 8-14 (1988), and sources cited therein.
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Geertz uses the slogan which American organized labor attempted
unsuccessfully to mobilize against the Taft-Hartley Act: 4 "slave labor
law." Understanding what is going on in this slogan helps one understand how Geertz's conception of "ideology" differs from the conventional conception. Conventionally, 5 this slogan is "ideological"
inasmuch as it was "exaggerated" and "caricatured," in short, distorted.
Geertz argues that as an understanding of how the slogan was supposed
to work, this is inaccurate if not downright insulting.16
That it might in fact draw its power from its capacity to grasp, formulate,
and communicate social realities that elude the tempered language of science, that it may mediate more complex meanings than its literal reading
suggests, is not even considered. 'Slave labor act' may be, after all, not a
label but a trope. More
17 exactly, it appears to be a metaphor or at least an
attempted metaphor.
Like all metaphors, it is "wrong": "It asserts of one thing that it is something else." 8 Like all metaphors, it "works" if the false identification can
come to seem "true"-which did not happen with "slave labor law"but does, I shall argue, with successful labor legislation, in which the
idealized portrait of industrial power relations can, like any metaphor,
come to seem "true." 19
Tambiah uses a different figure of political rhetoric. Indeed, his figure is employer, not union rhetoric: "the employer is to his workers as a
father is to his children." Nevertheless, if this works, in the sense of convincing workers, it works as a metaphor. And Tambiah assumes that his
readers are sufficiently familiar with persuasion of this kind as to serve
them as a metaphor for understanding Tambiah's interpretations of ritual; namely, that it is a persuasive process in which the properties of a
desired and desirable vertical relation are "persuasively transferred" to
another, undesirable condition.2 0
As a scholar and teacher of labor law, I read these two passages at
14.

Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982).
Geertz cites F. SuTrON, S. HARRIS, C. KAYSEN & J. TOBIN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CREED 4-5 (1956).
16. "It is rather hard to believe that either those who coined and disseminated the slogan themselves believed or expected anyone else to believe that the law would actually reduce (or was intended to reduce) the American worker to the status of a slave or that the segment of the public for
whom the slogan had meaning perceived it in any such terms." C. GEERTZ, supra note 9, at 210,
17. Id.
18. Id., quoting Percy, Metaphor as Mistake, 66 THE SEWANEE REV. 79, 81 (1958).
19. On law as metaphor, see generally Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning,
and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
20. S.TAMBIAH, supra note 13, at 71-73.
15.
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different times with ironic exhilaration. The irony lay in the fact that
these two anthropologists could assume that any educated reader would
grasp how these instances of labor relations rhetoric do or do not work in
her own culture, and thereby be in a position to understand more distant
cultures. The assumption is true only at a very superficial level. The sad
fact is that we do not understand how legal rhetoric, or labor relations
rhetoric "works," is grasped by people, influences consciousness, behavior, action.2 1 "We" do not understand this in our capacities as scholars of

law; nor do the political scientists, psychologists, historians, sociologists,
or anthropologists, or practical labor or management politicians under-

stand this much better; though, as we shall see, all these individuals have
much to contribute to our understanding. Our continued inability to understand this feature of law is indeed becoming scandalous.22

The exhilaration came, however, in realizing that we can in principle begin to understand these things, for we have made these laws ourselves.2 3 The essay which follows is not, and cannot be, a complete

theory of legal rhetoric, or even just of labor legislation. It may not even
count as a "breakthrough." 24 That will come when more in our profession become alive to the symbolic, the cultural, the rhetorical component
in our daily activities.
However, the claims I make for the theory even in its present nas21. A sweeping and imaginative recreation of the formation of working people's "world views"
or consciousness does not mention legal ideas at all. C. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS: THE DIVISION
OF LABOR IN INDUSTRY (1982) identifies different "world views" or career plans among Western
industrial workers and attributes these to experiences with job organization, such as the division of
labor and careers at work; experiences of conflict; relations to other work groups; national cultures;
and other factors. This is surely correct. I do not and would not suggest that legal ideas or even
struggles over legislation would contribute more than a bit to the formation of workers' consciousness. However, I believe that there are moments in history when such distinctively legal ideas and
struggles become important, as the excerpts from Geertz and Tambiah show. I am emboldened in
my exploration of these moments here because of the relative absence of any respectable theoretical
work about them in legal thought-as well as by Sabel's observation that the economic structures he
observes are, within the limits of competition, "fixed by political choices," Id. at 231; for the countries Sabel studied, "fixed political choices" may be equated with "law."
22. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 71 (1984), notes that the law-and-economics school has barely scratched the surface of the ways in which law can influence behavior, but
observes sadly that he cannot say, though he wishes he could, that we were on the verge of some
breakthrough in understanding here. See also Abel, RedirectingSocial Studies of Law, 14 LAW &
SoC'Y REV. 805, 824-29 (1980), a breathless research agenda from the heady days when it looked as
if Critical Legal Studies might join hands with and reorient Law and Society; little progress has been
made on it, needless to say.
23. This is simply an article of faith on my part, about which no one will feel better if I cite The
New Science of Giambattista Vico (1725).
24. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 22.
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cent state are not modest. I hope to sustain the thesis that an understanding of the symbolic dimension of labor law is critical to a solution of
several issues in the positive sociology of labor legislation, issues of extraordinary difficulty both from a sociological and a practical political
point of view; namely: under what circumstances will a given country
enact labor legislation or fundamentally alter its existing statutes? What
can be predicted about the features of labor legislation? So the reader
should not suppose from these genteel opening pages that yet another
exciting political struggle is about to be buried in a deep snow of social
science concepts, falling, like Joyce's snow, on the living and the dead. If
the theory of labor legislation is correct, this should have serious implications for the political strategy and practice of American labor.
But first let us describe the scope of the problem.
II.

THE PROBLEM: WHY Is THERE No NEW LABOR LEGISLATION
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?

Autobiographical introductions to research projects may be tedious.
I believe one fact is helpful to understanding this project. I first became
interested in the comparative processes of labor legislation in the fall of
1977, while teaching a seminar on comparative labor law. It was a good
time to teach such a seminar. In the previous decade, nearly every country in Western Europe had made substantial changes in its system of
labor law. The reforms bore little resemblance to each other; European
systems of labor law were incredibly diverse prior to 1968 and remain so
today. New ideas were in the air; European labor law seemed to be all
about change. Meanwhile, on our side of the Atlantic, mild technical
reforms of our labor legislation, of the most modest aspiration and limited potential effect, had been filibustered to death by a Democratic Senate under a Democratic Administration. This surely was a paradox to be
explained. Attention to the sociological processes of change in labor legislation did not seem, in 1977, to require any unusual perspicacity.
In the decade during which I have worked on this study, the problem of explaining why there is no new labor legislation in the United
States has neither been solved, nor has it gone away. It has, however,
altered its form. In 1977 there did not exist, either on the right or the left,
a critical literature on labor legislation articulating alternatives to the existing legislative structure. The conventions of law review writing at that
time required that proposed reforms take the general form of the failed
1977 reforms: administrative tinkering within an accepted structure. The
intellectual problem in 1977 was in explaining why the only sort of legis-
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lative change thinkable within the system was nevertheless unrealizable
in practice.
A decade later, the world is upside down. For as any reader of the
law reviews knows, there is now widespread among unions, management,
and intellectuals, strong dissatisfaction with the system of American labor law, and many articulate alternatives.2 5 What still is lacking is any
practical possibility that any such alternative will be enacted into positive
legislation. Consequently, attention to the underlying sociology of labor
legislation is if anything, more timely today than at any time in recent
history. Otherwise, the burst of creative thinking about labor relations
will come to precisely nothing. For every new approach which I have
seen would require substantial legislative reform, and none puts forward
any strategy for achieving reform, or advances our understanding of how
legislative reform could be achieved. Without such a strategic component, this torrent of new ideas will crash onto the rock of political obduracy, becoming nothing but mist.
But doesn't this very multiplicity of ideas simply illustrate why no
reforms have been enacted? Surely, if there were consensus around one
plan, reform would quickly follow? Like M. Jourdain speaking prose, our
objector has just uttered a positive theory of labor legislation: labor legislation results from a consensus among labor and management leaders. In
this case, the theory is a bad one. Consensus of values is not the answer;
it explains none of the three major American labor statutes. There was
no consensus among labor and management leaders which led to the pas25. A sample of the quite sweeping reforms of American labor legislation recently proposed
would include, in no particular order, the facilitation of cooperative representation structures advocated in C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING
CORPORATION (1988); the facilitation of union involvement in levels of corporate decision advocated
in Stone, Laborand the CorporateStructure: ChangingConceptions and EmergingPossibilities, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73 (1988); the thorough democratization of work advanced in Klare, The LaborManagement Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.- C. L. L.
REV. 39 (1988), and Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction:An Agenda for Legal
Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Catholic labor theory, Gregory, CatholicLabor Theory and
the Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119 (1988); and the deregulation of labor
relations and concomitant return to common law mooted, with perhaps varying degrees of seriousness, in the interview with Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO Chief Calls LaborLaws a "DeadLetter", Wall
St. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8, col. 2; R. FLANAGAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1987); Epstein, A Common Lawfor LaborRelations:A Critiqueof the New Deal LaborLegislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983); and the various contributors to LABOR LAW AND THE
EMPLOYMENT MARKET: FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS (R. Epstein & J. Paul eds. 1985). See
also, Oversight Hearingson the Subject "HasLabor Law Failed'" JointHearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Labor-ManagementRelations of the House Committee on Education and Labor and the
Manpower and Housing Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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sage of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935,26 LaborManagement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947,27 or Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959.28 Our
theory of labor legislation then, must discover what actually leads to la-

bor legislation.
There are essentially two ways in which we might do this: historical
study or comparative study. The historical study would go back to the
last truly foundational labor legislation in the United States: LandrumGriffin? Wagner?-and analyze the circumstances of its enactment. Returning to the Wagner Act, in this and other senses, has been a popular
activity over the last decade, and much has been learned. I will return to
this literature later in the study.2 9

The comparative study has not been undertaken in this context, and
that I propose to do now. There are many comparisons which might be
made for various purposes. In order to study the turn toward legislation,
it is necessary to make comparison with a country or countries which

have undertaken thoroughgoing revision of their labor statutes. The
countries chosen for comparison should bear some economic and social
similarity to our own.3" The last such wave of activity is still the Western

European reforms of the 1968-1976 period, and that is what Part III of
this Article will summarize. 3 '
I make no claims for comparative method as such except that it is
certainly suggestive that so many Western European countries with ad-

vanced industrial economies enacted fundamental changes in labor legislation during a decade in which the United States failed to enact rather

minor reforms. 32 The dangers in facile comparison among countries are
26. 49 Stat. 499 (1935), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
27. 61 Stat. 135 (1947), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982).
28. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
29. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
30. The advanced Western European countries, plus Canada (which has not undertaken fundamental reform), are the obvious comparisons for this purpose. I shall be referring to these countries
randomly as "advanced," "industrialized," and "capitalist," without thereby meaning to incorporate
any particular theory of legal development, such as Weberian or Marxist. On terminology, see generally Andrew Martin, The Politics of Economic Policy in the United States: A Tentative View from a
Comparative Perspective (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics No. 01-440, 1973).
31. The last decade or so has been one of weakness for labor all around the industrial world, yet
this fact has not (outside of Britain) led to repressive legislative reforms, or legislative reforms of any
kind. This fact is not without significance. We will return to it infra note 193 and accompanying text.
32. The statement in text is a bit too modest. I will want to claim infra Part V that the dominant
theories of legislation in American legal thought, namely the economic regulation theories of the
public choice school, Weberian developmental theories, and cruder variants of legitimation theory,
functionalist all, come a cropper in their inability to explain transnational variation in countries with
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well-known and I give them less than full treatment here not because I
am unmindful of them, but just because they are well-known.33
Part IV of the Article will sum up the European changes studied
and articulate a set of questions that the developments seem to raise. Part
V will review theories of legislation generally, or labor legislation, cursimilar economies. See Gordon Articles, supra note 2, for fuller treatment. So the comparative
method, to my mind, leads directly to inquiry into interpretive modes of explanation which are less
rigidly functionalist, perhaps not functionalist at all.
33. Two excellent and cautionary essays have guided my steps. See Summers, American and
European LaborLaw: The Use and Usefulness of ForeignExperience, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 210, 22728 (1966) ("The value in studying solutions developed by other countries, however, is not that they
can provide models which we can imitate, but rather that they can open our minds to fresh ways of
looking at our problems and suggest new kinds of solutions which we can tailor to meet our special
needs.").
A second is aimed at historians but applies as well to legal scholars. As the author is E.P. Thompson, the rhetoric is unsummarizable but well-worth reprinting:
Where the influence of the social sciences is undoubtedly most fruitful it is, at exactly the
same point, most trecherous: in the comparative method. For it is precisely at the point
where these 17th-century families become The Nuclear Family: where these 13th-century Russian peasants and those 19th-century Irish cottiers become The Peasantry:
where these Chartist Plug Rioters and those Communards become Violence in Industrial
Society: where, indeed, 18th-century Birmingham and a bazaar in 16th-century Persia
and a village in 20th-century Ecuador become assimilated as Pre-Industrial Society-it
is at this point that the integument of the historical discipline comes under extreme
strain, and is in danger of being punctured to let in a gush of abstract typological air.
The danger is worth taking; but each new concept so gained must be thrust back into the
ensemble of meanings of a specific historical context once again, and many of the concepts-perhaps the majority-will crumble to mere dust of irrelevancy in the immersion.
Perhaps the continual making and breaking of the integument is the best that we can do.
Thompson, Anthropology and the Discipline of HistoricalContext, 1 MIDLAND HIsT. (No. 3) 41, 46
(Spring 1972).
I have failed this advice. I fully agree that Thompson has described the next step. I would hope
that all the abstract air of this study will indeed be thrust into specific historical contexts by people
qualified to do so, but I cannot take that step myself. I fully grant that whatever insights this study
has are the inevitably somewhat superficial insights of one who has been reading a bit about a wide
range of campaigns for labor legislation, including some in countries where I do not even read the
local language. On the other hand, I do believe that comparative insights are worth making, if
treated with caution, and if they survive the "next step"-do people more familiar than I with the
specific areas studied, and others, find this approach enriches their research?
Clark, The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238 (1981), has stimulated
my thinking and inspired greater rigor in my approach. I have not however found "cost-reduction"
to be a helpful way of describing the behaviors that I have studied, for reasons to be explored infra,
text accompanying notes 158-60, unless "cost" is defined so broadly as to lose the chaste rigor of the
concept as applied by Clark.
Unfortunately, as is well-known, there are no sound methodological reasons not to apply such a
broad notion of "cost," so the apparent chastity of Clark's approach edges closer to arbitrariness. See
generally M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-85 (1987); Kennedy, Cost-

Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs:A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Kennedy &
Michelman, Are Propertyand ContractEfficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980).
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rently in vogue, in order to show that none really explains legislation of
the type studied. Part VI outlines my positive theory, which explains labor legislation chiefly in terms of well-timed increases in worker unrest.
Part VII is a more speculative discussion of recent work in anthropological and cognitive theory which lends support to the positive theory,
though the theory stands without it.

III.

FIVE NATIONAL STUDIES OF RECENT CHANGE IN LABOR LAW

Let us then turn to brief accounts of the processes leading to the
enactment in five Western European countries of some fundamental,
foundational statutes regulating labor relations. This is a tall order and it
would be idle to pretend that the accounts which follow are free of biasor that any imaginable alternative accounts would be free of bias either.
So let me explain the principles that went into the drafting of this section.
As I have mentioned, I first began reading about these countries
with no ulterior purpose of any kind except to accumulate information
about recent changes in labor law for preparation of a seminar in comparative labor law. What they now illustrate is simply the following:
these are countries which enacted fundamental changes in labor law, the
sort of change that is the theme of this study. This study is not an inquiry
into a random sample of employment statutes; it is focussed specifically
on the big ones: the statutes seen as laying fundamental groundwork for
the entire conduct of labor relations. 4
Within the group of countries which adopted such legislation during
the past twenty years, the five below have been chosen for two reasons.
First, to illustrate the substantive diversity of European labor law before
and after the 1970s. From a standpoint of substantive law, these five
countries had little in common as to what even counted as labor law:
34. For a discussion of the distinction between studying "law creation": basic revisions, really
new proposals, and more day-to-day law making, see Chambliss, On Lawmaking, 6 BRiT.J.L. & Soc.
149 (1979).
One cannot assume that the same social processes would govern the more quotidian work of
statutory amendment, regulation writing and administrative interpretations. Ronnie Steinberg makes
just this point in her excellent study of these low-level changes in American state wage and hour
regulation, R. STEINBERG, WAGES AND HOURS: LABOR AND REFORM IN TVENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 63, 74 (1982) (cautioning against studying only initial statutory adoptions). This does not
mean that the relevant social processes are entirely distinct, however. Indeed, Steinberg's meticulous
study of regulatory changes ultimately is in accord with this study: response to crisis predicted more
of the state-level increases in employment benefits than either of the more bureaucratic mechanisms;
that is, there was no real tendency for levels of benefit either to converge among states over time or
to simply proceed along predictable progressions from year-to-year. Id. at 140-155.
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whether there was a large or small quantity of labor law35 and what aspects of labor relations were subject to legal regulation. The 1970's reforms only underscore this diversity in substantive values-the better to
play up the commonalities in social process. Second, adequate accounts
in English exist for all five countries both for the substance of their legislation and the processes leading up to it.
In telling the stories which follow, I have certainly selected the facts
which help make my case; that is, the political and industrial context of
the legislative reforms. I have, moreover, omitted facts which would be
crucial to establishing certain rival hypotheses. For example, someone

who believed that labor legislation fundamentally reflects deep cultural
traditions long predating industrial civilization will find little to work
with in the following narratives, which largely start around 1945.36
However, in presenting my narratives of the events leading up to the
adoption of the most recent legislative reform, I have tried to stick as
closely as possible to a kind of neutral, official account of the sort that
almost any industrial relations scholar selected at random might produce, if she or he were asked to write a brief essay on the history of the

most recent legislative change.37 While it may seem utopian to aspire to
35. The idea of "quantifying" the amount of law comes from D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF
LAW (1976). It is not used here (any more than in Black) in any sort of sense you could put numbers
onto and use in a computer program. Rather, the intent is to convey a rough sense of countries
which have "a lot" of labor law or which "frequently" employ distinctively legal forms and personnel in the regulation of industrial life.
In truth, the idea of formulating broad general propositions about legal change and testing them
against evidence probably was also inspired in large measure by Black's book. The search was emboldened by the fact that Black's own theses were inadequate to the job. Black's book is an attempt
to explain the "quantity" of law with reference to a range of factors largely having to do with class or
status differences among relevant groups. Nothing in the book is very helpful as to the problem with
which I was concerned: cross-cultural variations in the "quantity" of law employed to govern exactly the same class or status relationship, namely employer-employee in countries at a similar level
of development. Black's book has since engendered a great amount of criticism which I will not, for
the reasons stated, take up here.
36. I regard the cultural traditions hypothesis as fairly implausible-if labor law can't build on a
modernist break with tradition, what could?-but, as we shall see, infra notes 162-68, it has its
notable adherents. Western European labor law before 1945 has been ably summarized in the essays
anthologized in THE MAKING OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NINE
COUNTRIES UP TO 1945 (B. Hepple ed. 1986)(hereinafter NINE COUNTRIES), and, while I learned
much from this volume, I learned little which directly aided understanding of the post-1968 reforms.
37. I am using "industrial relations" as a generic term, meaning people who study the organization of work and workers and conflicts around work issues. In some countries studied, the term itself
is controversial, as an American import, or because it is thought to commit the user to a research
program which studies something called "industrial relations systems," see generally J. DUNLOP,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS (1958), in isolation from political or economic systems. Whether
or not the latter course is compelled by Dunlop, which I doubt, it is not pursued here; indeed my
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such neutrality, it does in fact correspond to a certain genre of writing up
these histories; one which I have tried to follow. This explains the heavy
reliance on such quasi-official sources as reports to the International Labour Office (ILO). I have tried to read as widely as I could into these
events, but have not cited everything I have read, particularly if it was
not in English or not generally available. I have tried, in short, to come
up with fairly neutral accountings of the relationship between political
background, industrial unrest, and legislative change. This framework is
easy to follow because, for so many native observers of the events in
question, it appears "naturally" as the normal way of telling the story.
My ultimate aim, to be candid, is to get the reader to experience the
same sense of discovery I myself did. I would like you to be struck by the
great diversity of human imagination which has gone into the making of
labor law; the wide range of jobs given to legal institutions in various
countries, the different solutions to common problems. And at the same
time, I hope commonalties generally unnoticed by commentators will
also emerge: labor law as the creature of particular kinds of governing
coalitions faced with the demand to "do something" in the face of increased levels of unrest, and seizing certain standard techniques for
coping.
A.

France

France in the 1950s and 1960s had only a modest quantity of law
regulating collective labor relations. Like all the countries studied,
France had direct statutory regulation of certain issues which would be
bargainable in the United States, such as mandatory vacations. 38 The unions themselves are divided into rival confederations, economically weak,
and enroll the smallest percentage of the workforce in Western Europe.3 9
project could be defined, by those who like "systems" talk, either as a study in the relationship of
political-legal to industrial relations systems, or as a study of the political-legal system as it relates to
workplaces. I regard this dispute as terminological, unhelpfully so.
38. On the historical identification of French Socialists with increased mandated paid vacation,
see

D.

SINGER, Is SOCIALISM DOOMED? THE MEANING OF MITTERAND

107 (1988).

39. They are "unions of militants, in which the essential element of the organization is the
initiative and devotion of men motivated by conviction and the need for action." Reynaud, Industrial Relations Research in France 1960-75:. A Review, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS ON RESEARCH AND POLICY 262 (P. Doeringer ed. 1981)(hereinafter
IRIP), citing sources. General introductions to French unions are: THE FRENCH WORKERS' MOVEMENT: ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL CHANGE (M. Kesselman ed. 1984); Sellier & Silvestre,
Unions'Policiesin the Economic Crisisin France, in UNIONS IN CRISIS AND BEYOND: PERSPECTIVES

FROM SIX COUNTRIES 173-87 (R. Edwards, P. Garonna, & F. T6dtling eds. 1986), and Ross, The
Perils of Politics: French Unions and the Crisis of the 1970's, in UNIONS, CHANGE AND CRISIS:
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The foundational statute for postwar French labor law was the Act
of 11 February 1950. The law made the central legal institution of labor
relations the "collective agreement." This, however, is quite different
from what Americans mean by the term. Agreements under the 1950 Act
were to cover an entire industry or occupation, and apply to all establishments and workers in the covered industry." The Act also provided for
plant agreements to "adapt" the industry agreements to particular situations in individual firms.41 Conflict was largely unregulated.42
Under the 1950 Act, agreements remained in force until amended.
As a consequence, little pressure was felt to alter agreements once
reached, and collective bargaining was intermittent. 3 By 1960, 189 national industry agreements were in force and registered with the Ministry
of Labor. Between 1960 and 1964 bargaining virtually ceased due to employer refusal. During this period, actual wages paid rose considerably
above those stipulated in the agreements. Bargaining resumed somewhat
in scattered industries from 1965 to 1968, but as to national agreements
or social legislation, the period has been described as a "vacuum."' In
general, French industrial relations in this period may certainly be char15-93, (P.
Lange, G. Ross, & M. Vannicelli eds. 1982) [hereinafter FIUSPE].
40. An earlier law, on 16 May 1946, had set up elected works councils (comitds d'entreprises)
along the lines of a government order the previous year. Works councils exist today in over 80
percent of firms with over forty-nine employees; they are favored by employers and regarded with
suspicion by unions. Adam & Lucas, Les institutionsde reprisentationdu personnel en France: bilan
et perspectives, DRoiT SOCIAL, March 1979, at 79.
41. Loi du 11 fevrier 1950 sur les Conventions Collectives, still in effect and described in Dubois, Durand & Erb~s-Seguin, The Contradictionsof French Trade Unionism [hereinafter Dubois], in
1 THE RESURGENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1968 74-76, 80-81 (C.
Crouch & A. Pizzorno eds. 1978) [hereinafter RESURGENCE]. It does not impose any obligation of
negotiation or agreement.
42. The right to strike was conceptualized as belonging to the individual worker; thus the union
as an entity had no peace obligation. Giugni, The Peace Obligation, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 139 (B. Aaron & K. Wedderburn eds. 1972) [hereinafter INDUSFRENCH AND ITALIAN UNION STRATEGY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 1945-1980

TRIAL CONFLICT].

43. The presence of a collective agreement does not restrict resort to economic conflict, either in
law or practice.
44. Dubois, supra note 41, at 58 n.4.
The emphasis in the text on bargaining is not meant to suggest that there is any necessary virtue
in collective bargaining leading to a negotiated agreement, either American-style bargaining leading
to a plant agreement or French-style, allegedly leading to an industry agreement. Significant elements in the French and Italian labor movements in particular have long rejected this concept on
ideological grounds, viewing agreements with capital as class collaboration and insisting on a purely
oppositional role for unions. Id. at 71-73 (France). In particular, I do not wish to be understood as
allying myself with the dominant trend in industrial relations scholarship which still identifies American-style collective bargaining with maturity and high development: despite the beating that institution has taken at home! By emphasizing the low levels of bargaining in France, I mean only to
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acterized as "comparatively under-institutionalized."4 5
In May 1968 an extraordinary outburst of strikes and labor unrest,

much of it of rank-and-fie origin, came to involve between eight and ten
million workers.4 6 A dramatic meeting intended to revive the process of

bargaining was held at the Ministry of Social Affairs in rue de Grenelle.
The resulting "Grenelle" Statements or Protocol was announced by thenPrime Minister Pompidou with the agreement of the leaders of major

employer groups; the leaders of the major union confederations did not
sign the agreement, but nevertheless participated in the subsequent upsurge in bargaining and agreements concluded. 7

Bargaining extended to new sectors (such as certain public and nationalized enterprise) and new topics (such as hours, training, and profit
sharing).48 For example, between May 1968 and October 1969, the Ministry of Labor received seventy-one private-sector agreements on reduction of working hours-prior to May 1968 only three agreements had
ever covered reduced hours. Strike activity remained high over three
years, including some plant occupations and unilateral union reductions
in working hours.4 9
emphasize the dissonance between a legal system supposedly centered on that institution, and the
institution's virtual nonexistence on the ground.
45. Ross, supra note 39, at 20.
46. There are a great many memoirs, manifestos, and the like from the famous 1968 strikes, but
not a wide assortment of comprehensive academic treatments. The students seemed to get better
press than the workers. In English, the best start is probably G. Ross, WORKERS AND COMMUNISTS
IN FRANCE (1982). In French, two synthetic pictures are Pierre Dubois, Renaud Dulong, Claude
Durand, Sabine Erbes-Seguin, and Daniel Vidal, Grves revendicatives ou grves politiques?: Acteurs, Pratiques, Sens du Mouvement de Mai (1971) (on the causes of the strikes), and Jean-Daniel
Reynaud et al, Les &v6n6mentsde mai-juin 1968 et le systme frangais des relations professionnelles
(1972).
For an imaginative reading of the symbols and iconography of the student revolt which took
place at the same time, as well as brief accounts of efforts by French academics to interpret these
same symbols, see Turkle, Symbol and Festivalin the FrenchStudent Uprising (May-June 1968), in
SYMBOL AND POLITICS IN COMMUNAL IDEOLOGY

68 (S.Moore & B. Myerhoff eds. 1975). The

refusal of industrial relations experts on the scene to pay the same kind of attention to the symbolic
aspects of struggle is what has made the instant Article more programmatic than synthetic.
47. The Grenelle statements and subsequent recognition of unions by employers were described
at the time by the general secretary of the largest union confederation as "the most important legal
victory for the trade-union movement since 1884." Quoted in A. TOURAINE, M. WIEVORKA, & F.
DUBET, THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT

240 (1987).

48. Curiously, demands for changed working conditions or reduced hours decreased after 1968
as grounds for strikes. See Dubois, supra note 41, at 61-65. The events of 1968 succeeded in triggering bargaining over these demands, despite their lessened salience to the workers involvedl
49. In hindsight, it appears that "France is one of the few countries in Europe where the annual
average number of days lost by strikes from 1969 to 1972 is not much higher than from 1964 to
1967." Reynaud, France: Elitist Society Inhibits Articulated Bargaining,in WORKER MILITANCY
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1965-75: NEw DIRECTIONS IN WESTERN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 279
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In addition, two national multi-industry agreements entered into between employers' associations and union confederations in February
1969 and July 1970 covered respectively, job security (including standardized procedures for layoffs involving notice to new plant works

councils and compensation for laid-off employees) and vocational training (including the right to educational leaves of absence). Such multiindustry agreements were not mentioned in the 1950 Act, and their legal

status was unclear.
A trio of statutes between 1968 and 1971 attempted collectively to

order the chaos by institutionalizing industrial relations at (successively)
the workplace, company, and multi-industry levels. The Act, Number
68-1179 of December 27, 1968, Respecting the Exercise of the Right of
Association in Undertakings, recognized plant-level branches of unions
(sections syndicales d'entreprise) for the first time. These branches were

granted the right, on plant premises, to post notices, collect dues, and
hold meetings. The Act also provided procedures for designating delegates to plant-level work commissions.5 0
Company level agreements were recognized in the law of 30 June
51
1971, to adapt industry agreements to the situation in particular firms.
(S. Barkin ed. 1975). As Reynaud points out, however, the strikes in the later period seized the
public imagination due to the high incidence of building occupations and other illegal conduct and
the low incidence of conventional economic pressure.
50. 1968 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1968-Fr.2. While this legislation influenced the later Italian statute
of 1970, discussed infra note 75, it had nowhere near the latter's impact: employer resistance to
shopfloor unionism and low union priority on shopfloor struggles prevented any major increases in
union shopfloor power. See Ross, supra note 39, at 29. As a general matter, all the French legislation
in the wake of the Grenelle agreements imposes nothing on employers absent further enforcement
regulations (ddcretsd'application),which take a long time to appear, or negotiated settlements. Dubois, supra note 41, at 75-76. This diffidence about enforcement is characteristic of labor legislation,
particularly that described by my model; I will return to the significance of this point infra notes
198-200.
A major theme of all the French legislation to be mentioned was the institutionalization of the
"representative" unions, that is, practically speaking, those affiliated with the national confederations. Only these attain rights under the legislation; it is essentially impossible to organize a new
rank-and-file organization and have it achieve recognition as a union. See Sellier & Silvestre, supra
note 39, at 174-75.
51. 1971 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1971-Fr.3. The law was ineffective in encouraging company-level
bargaining, which was barely known before the law and did not grow after it; by 1981 only 9.9
percent of firms had company-level agreements, while 76.9 percent were covered by industry-level
agreements. Eyraud & Tchobanian, The Auroux Reforms and Company Level IndustrialRelations in
France, 23 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 241, 242 (1985) (Ministry of Labor survey). The article attributes
the reluctance to bargain at the company level to the respective strategies of unions and employers.
Unions fear the incorporation of company-level bargainers into management's point of view, resulting in weak "company unions" (as Americans would say); employers prefer a united front and fear
interfirm competition.
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Finally, Act Number 71-561 of 13 July 1971 gave multi-industry agreements the status of collective agreements under the 1950 Act. Failure to
negotiate was made a punishable offense, and the legal scope of bargaining was broadened to include the frequency of wage reviews, the compensation of temporary and part-time workers, and equal pay for equal work
by female and young employees. 2
The general post-1973 economic downturn in the industrialized

world did not end creative thinking about labor relations in France, but
it certainly led to legislation and government report in unusually timid

form.13 The Act of 27 December 1973 Respecting the Improvement of

Working Conditions required consultation (but not agreement) with the
works commission over working conditions.5 4 Two years of negotiations

on working conditions at the national level followed, culminating in an
agreement of 17 March 1975 which the two largest union confederations
did not sign. Continued discussions at the industry and firm levels were

contemplated. Legislation in 1973 and 1975 dealt gingerly with individual discharges and group layoffs, respectively. 5

Since 1975, extended public discussion of worker participation in
enterprise has crystallized around the Sudreau Report of that year, the
Report of the Committee to Study Company Reform, created July 1974.

This Report avoided recommendations of legally-imposed structures but
56
contented itself with suggestions addressed to unions and management.

The legislative agenda shifted sharply with the election of a Socialist
government under President Francois Mitterand in 1981. Despite the

limited success of past legislative efforts to encourage bargaining or con52. 1971 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1971-Fr.3. See generally Delamotte, Recent Collective Bargaining
Trends in France, 103 INT.LAB. REV. 351 (1971). The law "was prepared after thorough consultation with both labor and management and was passed unanimously by parliament." Reynaud, supra
note 39, at 259. The law did not lead to any increase in multi-industry agreements: "there were just
as many instances of such negotiations from 1968 to 1971 as there were from 1971 to 1974." Dubois,
supra note 40, at 84.
53. Union membership began decreasing around 1974 and has declined since. Sellier & Silvestre,
supra note 39, at 178-87.
54. 1973 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1973-Fr. 2. This was accomplished in part by lifting an earlier prohibition on variations in working hours and part-time work which had impeded the development of
bargaining. The Act also created a National Agency for the Improvement of Working Conditions.
55. The 1973 law requires only that an employer state in writing the reasons for the discharge.
The 1975 law on group layoffs is tougher; it requires consultation with the enterprise committee
fifteen days to three months before layoffs (depending whether the layoff was cyclical or structural
and how many are affected). Approval of the inspector of labor is also required, but in practice this
was not difficult to obtain. See Sellier & Silvestre, supra note 39, at 194.
56. LA RItFORME DE L'ENTREPRISE: RAPPORT DU COMITt PR ISDE PAR PIERRE SUDREAU
(1975) [hereinafter SUDREAU REPORT].
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sultation at a particular level,5 7 it was believed once again that legislation
could help institutionalize negotiations which had not previously been
seen by unions and employers as in their interest.
This legislation is known collectively as the "Auroux Laws" of 4
August, 28 October, 13 November and 23 December 1982. I will discuss
5
the first three.
The first of these, the Law of 4 August 1982 on Workers' Rights
seeks to introduce a novel channel of expression at the workplace by
guaranteeing workers the right of direct, unmediated, unrepresented collective expression on the content, organization, and conditions of work.59
This right of unrepresented expression is supposed to coexist with the
other versions of workplace expression favored earlier, namely representation by the works council and representation by the union's branch.6 0
Employers have been able to use this legislation more effectively than
workers or unions: early agreements have isolated the "expression"
groups from the representative bodies, specifying, for example, that management personnel will chair the "expression" meetings, or that the
union need not be informed of management's responses to questions, or
that the union may not be invited to attend "expression meetings." Some
employers have gone further and incorporated the meetings into "quality
circle" type programs.6"
The established channels of representation were supposed to be
strengthened by the companion Law of 28 October 1982 on Representative Institutions.6" The works committees are now entitled to additional
information about mergers, shutdowns, and company finances. The
union branches are given additional rights to communicate in plants and
additional protection against retaliation. This enhanced institutional
presence for unions at the workplace has not been reflected in any in57. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
58. The fourth, 1983 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1983-Fr. 2E, deals with health, safety, and working
conditions and falls outside this study.
59. 1983 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1983-Fr. 2B.
60. The SUDREAU REPORT, supra note 56, had advocated direct expression by employees, and
successive governments of the right and left had studied methods of institutionalizing this. Summers,
infra note 79, at 389, attributes this concern to interest in "workplace democracy," but one could
also trace a particularly French distrust of representation and support for direct expression, back to
Rousseau.
61. See Eyraud & Tchobanian, supra note 51, at 250-52. See also W. SMITH, CRISIS IN THE
FRENCH LABOUR MOVEMENT: A GRASSROOTS' PERSPECTIVE 215-19 (1987); A. BORZEIx, D.
LINHART, & D. SEGRESTIN, SUR LES TRACES DU DROIT D'EXPRESSION (1985).
62. 1983 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1983-Fr. 2C.
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crease in membership, which continues to decline.63
Company level bargaining was the subject of the Law of 13 Novem-

ber 1982 on collective bargaining, creating a duty to bargain (but not
agree) yearly at the firm level, on wages, hours, and work organization.

As we saw above, company-level bargaining has not been favored by
French unions or employers and there is little reason to assume that the
new legislation will alter matters."
B.

Italy
Article 39 of the Italian Constitution of 1948 guarantees the right to

form unions and employers' associations and the right to strike, but provides no enforcement mechanism in the event of interference with these
"rights." Nor was any implementing legislation enacted until 1970, due
in part to disagreements among the union confederations. Until 1970,
Italy (with the United Kingdom) had the smallest quantity of positive
labor law in Western Europe.65 Workers were represented both by unions, which are split along religious and political lines and tend to view

themselves as advancing a broad range of political concerns beyond
working conditions, 66 and by plant-level elected internal commissions,
which grew up without statutory authorization or regulation.
63.

67

Strikes

Ross, From One Left to Another: Le Social in Mitterand'sFrance,in THE MITTERAND EX-

PERIMENT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MODERN FRANCE (G. Ross, S. Hoffmann, & S.
Malzacher eds. 1987). See also W. SMITH, supra note 61, at 218.

64. 1983 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1983-Fr. 2D; Eyraud & Tchobanian, supra note 51, at 252-56. Modest increases in limited negotiation are depicted in Delamotte, La loi et la nigociation collective en
France: Riflexion sur l'expirience 1981-1985, 42 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 92 (1987).
65. Legal scholarship concerned itself in the main with rules not created by the state, the socalled "ordinamento intersindacale"or rules created by the daily activities of unions and employers,
See generally Giugni, The Italian System ofIndustrialRelations, in IRIP, supra note 39, at 332-34
(Giugni originated the concept of "ordinamento intersindacale");Veneziani, Labour Law Research
in Italy, in LABOUR LAW RESEARCH IN TWELVE COUNTRIES 169-70 (S.Edlund ed. 1986) [hereinafter TWELVE COUNTRIES].
66. Most of the literature in English about Italian unions is now between thirty and forty years
old. A concise introduction with references is Lange & Vannicelli, Strategy underStress: The Italian
Union Movement and the Italian Crisis in Developmental Perspective, in FIUSPE, supra note 39, at
95-206.
Structures existed on paper in the 1950's to integrate unions into economic decisionmaking, but
were virtually unused. Weitz, LaborandPoliticsin a Divided Movement: The Italian Case, 28 INDUS,
& LAB. REL. REV. 226, 229-30 (1975).
67. In theory the commisione interni, under the 1953 national agreement between union and
employer federations which created them, were supposed to handle grievances; in fact they engaged
in bargaining on a range of issues, particularly piece-rates. See Contini, Politics,Law and Shop Floor
Bargainingin PostwarItaly, in SHOP FLOOR BARGAINING AND THE STATE: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 200 (S.Tolliday & J. Zeitlin eds. 1985); Sciarra, The Rise of the Italian
Shop Steward, 6 INDUS. L.J. 35, 36-37 (1977). However, they were rather ineffectual bodies of work-
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in the private sector were unregulated, apart from occasional ministerial
mediation of labor disputes, on an entirely ad hoe basis, without any
statutory authorization or regulation. 8 Unions operated mainly nationally or province-wide, but were not present in any meaningful sense at
the plant level.6 9
The years 1968 to 1970 saw an upsurge in industrial unrest.70 Most
of this was at the shop floor and headed by popular representatives or
stewards.7 1 It was an era of high strike rates including participation by
public servants and white-collar workers, new forms of worker organiza-

tion, new forms of conflict (brief strikes, rolling strikes, go-slows, plant
occupation), and new demands (equal increases for all, upgrading of positions). The unions had neither created nor anticipated this activity, but
lost little time in successfully incorporating it into their organizations,
and basing new plant-level operations on the stewards and new works
councils.7 2
place representation since they were unable to link up with other such bodies, while their internal
factions, corresponding to the union confederations, were able to link up with other bodies. W.
GALENSON, TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE 7 (1962).
68.

B. VENEZIANI, LA MEDIAZIONE DEI PUBBLICI POTERI NEI CONFLITTI COLLETTIVI DI

LAVORO (1972).
69. T. TREU, SINDACATO E RAPPRESENTANZE AZIENDALI: MODELLI ED ESPERIENZE DI UN
SINDACASTO INDUSTRIALE, FLM-CISL 1954-1970 (1971).
70. This peaked in the so-called "hot autumn" of 1969, and declined slowly through the 1970's.
Like the French "events of May 1968," these have engendered an enormous literature of memoirs
and manifestoes but lack a good English-language introduction. See generally C. SABEL, supra note
21, at 145-67; S. TARROW, DEMOCRACY AND DISORDER: PROTEST AND POLITICS IN ITALY 19651975 (1989); Regalia, Regini & Reyneri, Labour Conflicts and IndustrialRelationsin Italy [hereinafter Regalia], in I RESURGENCE supra note 41, at 101-58; Brandini, Italy: Creatinga New Industrial
Relations System From the Bottom, in WORKER MILITANCY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1965-75:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN WESTERN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 82-117 (S. Barkin ed. 1975). Standard
Italian references are D. GRISONI & H. PORTELLI, LE LOTTE OPERAIE IN ITALIA DAL 1960 AL 1976
at 45-160 (1977); LOTTE OPERAIE E SINDACATO IN ITALIA, 1968-1972 (A. Pizzorno ed. 1974)(6
vols.); G. GiUGNI, IL SINDACATO TRA CONTRATTI E RIFORME, 1969-1973 (1973).
71. These delegatioperai,which (when later institutionalized) replaced the old internal commissions, see supra note 67, were truly a new generation in industrial relations: their average age was
between thirty and thirty-five and only thirty percent belonged to any political party. Giugni, Recent
Trends in Collective Bargainingin Italy, 104 INT'L. LAB. REV. 307, 324 n.1 (1971). See generally R.
AGLIETA, G. BIANCHI & P. BRANDINI, I DELEGATI OPERAI: RICERCA SU NUOVE FORME DI RAPPRESENTANZA OPERAIA (1970) [hereinafter R. AGLIETA].
72. See Regalia, supra note 70, at 141-46; R. AGLIETA, supra note 71; T. TREU, supra note 69.
In the heady days of 1969-71, there was much discussion about the novelty of the delegati-who
were (and are) elected directly by work groups, without prior nomination, may be recalled by the
group, and need not join the union-and their links, if any, with the historic theories of Antonio
Gramsci on workers' control. "Now, after a lapse of some years, it is generally accepted that the
system of shop-floor delegates in Italy is simply a variation of the trade union organization and not a
new form of worker participation (a view held by the unions themselves)." Giugni, in IRIP, supra
note 39, at 346.
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This new importance of workplace industrial relations was reflected
in the comprehensive revision of Italian labor law in 1970. The Statuto
dei Lavoratori,Act Number 300 of 20 May 1970, guaranteed unions and
employees sweeping rights at the plant level.74 Unions were given the
right to meetings on premises, up to ten hours a year of which could be
on working time, the right to veto transfers of union leaders, paid time
off for union leaders, and the right to collect dues and communicate in
the plant. Employees were given protection against unjust dismissal; free-

dom from audio-visual surveillance or required medical examinations;
the right to expression of views without retaliation; the right to tell their

side of the story before imposition of discipline. Most significantly, lower
courts were given jurisdiction over violations of the statute, touching off
a wave of such litigation, in practice, tried before the youngest (and frequently most radical) magistrates.75 Italian scholars remain quite divided
73. The history of reform proposals in the 1968-70 period is traced in Calavita, Worker Safety,
Law, and Social Change: The Italian Case, 20 LAW & Soc. REv. 189, 203-206 (1986). Pre-1968
versions had gone nowhere. Following legislative elections in 1968, the three leftmost parties introduced workers' rights bills. In 1969, a Senate Commission was charged with reporting to the Ministry of Labor on the need for any legislation and the possibility of receiving input from employers and
unions. The ruling Christian Democrats introduced their proposal in June 1969, explicitly designed
to protect unions and "normalize" industrial relations. This was followed closely by the proposal of
the complete governing coalition and the report of the Senate Commission, both close to the Christian Democrats' proposal (for example, all lacked health and safety legislation). Following the "hot
autumn" of 1969, the Communists successfully grafted some of their proposals onto the government's bill (including health and safety features), and the legislation was broadened again in the
Senate in December 1969 to create a role for unofficial worker delegates.
74. 1970 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1970-It.2. The main goal of the statute has been described as the
strengthening of union organization at the workplace level in order to withstand threats from employers and spontaneous workers' groupings. Giugni, supra note 71, at 318. For example, only unions associated with national confederations or signatory to national agreements may participate in
the consigli difabbrica or works councils which the statute creates. Sciarra, supra note 67, at 40.
The intellectual origins of the statute have been traced to two quite different currents in Italian
labor, corresponding to the two leading union confederations: a Marxist or left-wing strain which
had long wanted, as the slogan had it, "the Constitution in the factory," (i.e. bring freedom to the
"private" sector), see, eg., Cazzola, La CGIL e il diritto sindacale, Quaderni di Rassegna Sindacale,
No. 46 (1972); and an American-influenced strain which wanted a legal framework to protect and
institutionalize the union as an entity at the plant level, patterned after the Wagner Act. Contini,
supra note 67, at 204. American influence on CISL, the union confederation allied (formerly closer
than today) with the Christian Democratic party, has been direct and strong; many CISL staff were
trained at a school in Florence with close ties to American labor. See Lange & Vannicelli, supra note
66, at 114-15.
Employers however must have realized that the historic weakness of Italian unions, their exclusion from power, and the low level of wages, created a possibility of radical change which the institutionalization of unions might cabin. M. SALVATI, ALLE ORIGINI DELL'INFLAZIONE ITALIANA 65
(1979), quoted in Lange & Vannicelli, supra note 66, at 127-28.
75. Unjust dismissal had in theory been impermissible under a 1960 statute, but that lacked a
reinstatement remedy which the 1970 legislation provided. Workers are allowed to choose an arbi-
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over the impact of this dramatic increase in legal regulation on individual
employees. 76
The next level of union strategy in the early 1970s involved a working alliance of the union confederations and an attempt to deal directly
with the government, outside their traditional party allies, on a variety of
social and developmental concerns. This strategy never succeeded; union
power was weakened sharply in the general economic downturn following the 1973-1974 oil crisis, and has never really recovered.77 There have
been no significant legislative initiatives to concern us.
C. German FederalRepublic
In contrast to Italy, postwar West Germany presents a high quan-

tity of labor law. Meticulous legal regulations have consistently covered
worker representation at the plant level (through the works council), at
the level of corporate management (through the institution of worker
directors), and bargaining and conflict, typically at a regional industry
level, between unions and management. A trio of significant postwar stattrator but, apparently in the early years, preferred to choose judges. Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Manpower and Social Affairs Directorate. Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining. Final Report of the International Management Seminar, Castelfusano 21st-24th
Sept. 1971 at 24.
76. F. Rossiti and Tiziano Treu, L'applicazione dello Statuto dei Lavoratori, Sociologia del Diritto, no. 2 (1974) (reporting disagreement among Italian observers).
Certainly the intent of the statute was to consolidate and institutionalize the union advances of
the hot autumn, and if that period had any long-lasting effects, which some doubt, it may be through
the statute. Contini, supra note 67, at 210. S. TARROW, supra note 70, at 313-14, claims that the
statute heightened a trend already under way to pursue grievances through legal means as opposed
to direct action (citing judicial records).
It is interesting however that not one of the workers in a collection of interviews with Italian
workers (conducted in 1979) mentions the statute, despite extensive recollections of the hot autumn
period. J. BARKAN, VISIONS OF EMANCIPATION: THE ITALIAN WORKERS' MOVEMENT SINCE 1945

(1984). A similar divergence between workers' accounts of their situation and union leaders' is apparently revealed by a major Italian survey. D. DE MASI & G. FEVOLA, I LAVORATORI
NELL'INDUSTRIA ITALIANA (1974), discussed in Giugni, in IRIP, supra note 39, at 350 n.107. A
recent (17 October 1983) construction of the statute by the Court of Cassation greatly diminishes the
number of enterprises to which it applies, but this occurred long after the interviews mentioned.
In M. PIORE & C. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY
228 (1984), the authors attribute the survival of their darlings, Italian artisan firms, in part to their
exemption from the Statuto dei Lavoratori, and thus in a weird way provide backhand evidence for
the statute's efficacy.
Calavita, supranote 73, at 212-18, discusses the modest but real impact of the statute's provisions
on health and safety.
77. Lange & Vannicelli, supra note 66, at 131-180; J. BARKAN, supra note 76, at 160 (1980
defeat at FIAT); Garonna & Pisani, Italian Unions in Transition: The Crisisof PoliticalUnionism, in
UNIONS IN CRISIS AND BEYOND 147-57 (R. Edwards, P. Garonna, & F. Tddtling eds. 1986); Contini, supra note 67, at 211-15.
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utes provides the legal framework.7 8
The Works Constitution Act of 1952 makes the fundamental unit of
workplace representation, the works council, elected by all employees.79

While the 1952 legislation applied in theory to each enterprise with more
than five employees, only some 6 percent of enterprises ever established a
works council under the 1952 Act. These were, however, the largest en-

terprises, employing two-thirds or so of German workers.80 Unions are
given no formal role to play in this system, although in practice they run
candidates for the works council, some 80 percent of whose members are
union members. 8 The 1952 legislation, in theory, limited the power of

the works council to the form, principles, time and place of wage payment, job descriptions, working time and overtime, bonuses and premiums above the basic wage rates, fringe benefits, and disciplinary rules.

The legislation expressly restricts the council's function in economic decisions, such as curtailment of production or the closing of an enterprise,

to the receipt of information. The employer retains the right of "technical and commercial management." Nor may the council bargain over
basic wage rates, which are to result from employer-union bargaining.
Finally, the council is constrained by a general duty of "trustful cooperation" and forbidden any resort to economic action.
Union-employer bargaining, in theory an entirely separate system,
was governed by the Collective Agreements Act of 1949, which made
collective agreements enforceable without governmental action. 82 Agreements are entered into between unions and employer associations, and
78. See generally Reichel, Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 104 INT'L LAB. REV. 469 (1971).
79. This legislation was adopted against the votes of the Social Democrats and over the opposition of the union confederation. Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, Economic Development, Labour Conflicts
and the IndustrialRelationsSystem in West Germany, in 1 RESURGENCE, supra note 41, at 288. The
history of German works councils and their tension with unions is traced in Summers, Worker
Participationin the U.S. and West Germany:A ComparativeStudy from an American Perspective, 28
AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 373-75 (1980).
80. Ramm, Co-determinationand the German Works ConstitutionAct of1972, 3 INDuS. L. J. 20
(1974).
81. See id.; Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 282 n.13. However, at least in the
service industries, only forty percent of works council members reported good relations with unions.
Summers, supra note 79, at 373 n. 11 (1980)(citing studies). In turn, works councils help organize
unions, collect dues, recruit members; and union members with works council experience dominate
the unions organizationally in various ways. Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 282. See
also W. STREECK, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN WEST GERMANY: A CASE STUDY OF THE CAR
INDUSTRY (1984).
82. The Minister of Labor may "extend" agreements to cover all establishments in a given industry and region. Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 304 n.10; Bergmann & MfillerJentsch, The FederalRepublic of Germany: CooperativeUnionism and DualBargainingSystem Chal-
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cover general base wages, job evaluation systems, bonuses, premiums,
and other terms of employment. Agreements typically cover an entire
Land, or several Lnder, and an industry as heterogeneous as "metals"
(which includes shipbuilding, automobile manufacturing, the optical industry, precision machinery, and musical instrument manufacture). By a
1967 decision of the Federal Labor Court, they must also apply equally
to union members and non-members.
This so-called dual industrial relations system of workplace representation by works councils, and regional wage negotiation by unions,
has legislative roots as far back as 1920. While the Collective Agreements
Act does not prohibit unions from bargaining at a subregional or enterprise level, unions have made few such attempts, and most employers
resist the practice.8 3
The Collective Agreements Act, as interpreted by the Federal Labor
Court, also regulates the weapons of economic conflict. Here again legal
regulation is high. Conduct in labor disputes must accord with Sozialadaquanzor "social appropriateness," a vague criterion further amplified by the Federal Labor Court as "the moral social order of the Society
as it developed historically." As applied, this has resulted in comparatively severe legal restrictions on use of the strike. The strike may not be
employed during the term of a contract or pending negotiations; a union
was once fined for conducting a strike vote under such circumstances.8 4
Strikes must be approved by a vote of 75 percent of the membership;
strikes by smaller groups or without authorization by the union are illegal."5 The strike is a measure of last resort, and the union must be prepared to present evidence on the exhaustion of alternative contractual
mechanisms, which frequently include mediation or arbitration. Finally,
the ultima ratio of the strike must also be "socially appropriate," and this
has been used to forbid strikes with political or other objectives beyond
lenged, in WORKER MILITANCY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1965-75: NEW DIRECTIONS IN WESTERN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 253 (S. Barkin ed. 1975).
83. Zoll, Centralisation and Decentralisationas Tendencies of Union Organisationaland Bargaining Policy: A Comparison of Union Structures at Shop-Floor Level in Italy and in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in 2 THE RESURGENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE
1968 at 127 (C. Crouch & A. Pizzorno eds. 1978). Unions' organizational interests in the plant are
represented by elected shop stewards who are expected to communicate union policies to members
and organize support for the union during bargaining. In practice, the stewards work closely with
the works council. See Muller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 282-83.
84. See Bergmann & Miiller-Jentsch, supra note 82, at 255; see also Schmidt, IndustrialAction,
in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT, supra note 42, at 41.
85. Schmidt, supra note 85, at 41.
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improvement of working conditions.8 6
The third institution of worker representation is the well-known
scheme of Co-determination or Mitbestimmung; that is, worker participation on corporate supervisory boards."7 Unlike the two other institutions, this is a postwar innovation; like them, it is extensively regulated
legally. This co-determination originated in the immediate postwar needs
of the Allied Administration to resume industrial activity without excessive reliance on those too closely associated with the Nazi Period. There
are, however, sharp differences of opinion on the forces which kept codetermination from expiring with the Occupation.8 8 In any event, the
Co-determination Act of May 21, 1951, which applied only to the coal,
iron and steel industries, provided that half the seats on the supervisory
board (roughly equivalent to the board of directors) be held by employee
representatives, and that the worker representatives appoint the labor director to the smaller management board. 9 The Works Constitution Act
of 1952, one year later, extended a weaker version of worker representation, involving one-third of board seats, to industries other than coal,
iron and steel. 90 One effect of this discrepancy was a wave of mergers in
coal, iron and steel, which put more companies under this later Act. Between 1952 and 1968, the number of companies subject to the stricter co86. Hartmann & Conrad, IndustrialRelationsin West Germany, in IRIP, supra note 39, at 22526, citing Schacht & Unterseher, Das Tarifsverhandlungssystemder Bundesrepublik, in Verteilungskampfund Stabilitdtspolitik(W. Meisner & L. Unterseher eds. 1972); Bergmann & Miiller-Jentsch,
supra note 83, at 254-56.
87. Numerous descriptive accounts are available in English, including Hartmann, Codetermination Today and Tomorrow, 13 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 54 (1975); Hartmann, Codetermination in West
Germany, 9 INDUS. REL. 137 (1970); Roberts, The Works Constitution Acts andIndustrialRelations
in West Germany: Implications for the United Kingdom, 11 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 338 (1973);
Szakats, Workers' Participation in Management: The German Experience, 16 J. INDUS. REL. 29
(1974). Leminsky, Worker Participation:The German Experience, in LABOR RELATIONS IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 141 (B. Martin & E. Kassalow eds. 1980),
traces codetermination back to 1922 legislation permitting works councils to appoint one or two
members of supervisory boards. Most observers however attribute the current institution to postwar
needs.
88. Hartmann & Conrad, supra note 86, at 141, claims that the unions and Social Democratic
Party showed little enthusiasm for the co-determination system, which was supported most strongly
by the Catholic wing of the labor movement, while Bergmann & Miiller-Jentsch, supra note 82, and
Leminsky, supra note 87, claim that only a threatened mass strike in May 1951 prevented repeal of
the program. Another version is that, while outside Germany codetermination is seen as an experiment in participation, inside Germany it is considered by unions and management alike as a conscious attempt to expand the power of the union hieracrchy. See Kirkwood & Mewes, The Limits of
Trade Union Power in the CapitalistOrder: The Case of West German Labour's Questfor Co-Determination, 14 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 295, 296 (1976).
89. 1951 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1951-Ger.F.R.2.
90. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, Law of Oct. 11, 1952, 1952 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1952-Ger.F.R. 6.
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determination dropped by over one-third. Union dissatisfaction, and the
entry of the Social Democrats into a "grand coalition" in 1966, led to the
appointment the following year of a commission under Kurt Biedenkopf
to study co-determination.
Another effect of the entry of the Social Democrats into the national
government was the adoption of more Keynesian economic policies
which included voluntary wage restraint by the unions in return for
promises of later "symmetry" with profits. This "symmetry" was not obtained by 1969. In that year, a Social Democratic election victory replaced the "grand coalition" with one dominated by Social Democrats.
In September of that year there were spontaneous strikes, particularly in metal and building trades, an unprecedented event in postwar
German labor relations, which had been virtually free of strikes of any
kind for over ten years, let alone unofficial strikes. 91 Observers surveyed
tended to regard these strikes as "local and apolitical," largely a protest
against national union wage restraint, wage inequalities, and high profits, 92 although they were doubtless also influenced by similar activity
elsewhere in Western Europe. This wave ended the period of voluntary
cooperation with government wage planning, and a round of bargained
contracts, which did not particularly satisfy the rank-and-file.9 3 Another
wave of strikes, mainly spontaneous, took place in 1973. Demands were
but also involved some protests
principally for cost-of-living adjustments,
94
over intensification of work.
In the midst of this increase in unrest, the Biedenkopf Commission
reported to Parliament.9 The Report was favorable to co-determination
as then practiced, finding it accepted by management and labor, and not
an impediment to managerial efforts at increased efficiency. It did not
recommend any further expansion of the practice; however, Parliament
went beyond the report and adopted two bills expanding the authority of
institutions of worker representation.
91.

Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 262 (Figure 7.1).

92. P. SWENSON, FAIR SHARES: UNIONS, PAY, AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY 73 (1989); see also Bergmann, Neues Lohnbewusstsein und Septemberstreiks, in GEWERKSCHAFTEN UND KLASSENKAMPF 1972 (0. Jacobi et al eds. 1972); M. SCHUMANN et al, AM
BEISPIEL DER SEPTEMBERSTREIKS-ANFANG DER REKONSTRUKTIONSPERIODE DER ARBEITER-

KLASSE? (1971), both summarized in Hartmann & Conrad, in IRIP, supra note 39, at 227; and
Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 261-69.
93. The pre-1968 style of negotiating collective agreements involved no participation of union

members and relatively automatic wage increases. Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supranote 79, at 265.
94. P. SWENSON, supra note 92, at 78-83; Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 263-69.
95. MITBESTIMMUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN (1970). See also K. BIEDENKOPF, MITBESTIMMUNG:
BEITRAGE ZUR ORDNUNGSPOLITISCHEN DISKUSSION (1972).
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The Works Constitution Act of 1972 amended the 1952 Act to in-

crease the rights of the works council to influence on piecework and bonus rates, quality of work, safety, layoffs, transfers, dismissal, and
protection of minority groups.9 6 A previous maximum size limit of
thirty-five was deleted to permit smaller ratios of representation in very
large establishments. Foreign workers were made eligible for the works

council. 97 The "cooperation" obligation was not diminished, and man-

agement retained the right to economic decisions and to managerial decisions which do not increase employee workload.98 In case of work
reductions or closing, the works council is limited to demands for compensation for affected employees. 9 9

The Co-determination Act of 1976 was adopted unanimously by the
Bundestag. It extended worker "parity" on the supervisory board to all

companies with over 2,000 employees. The "parity" is somewhat illusory
since one employee representative must represent middle and upper management, who are not expected to side routinely with workers; moreover,

the chairman, who can break ties, may be elected in the event of deadlock on the whole supervisory board, by the shareholder representatives
alone. I° A challenge by employers to the constitutionality of the law was
rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1979.101
96. 1972 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1972--Ger.F.R. 1. See generally Ramm, supra note 80. "There is a
general consensus, however, that these concessions are difficult to make use of because they are
closely hedged, and fairly limited to begin with." Hartmann & Conrad, in IRIP, supra note 39, at
237.
97. As of 1975 they comprised 2.9 percent of the membership, a far cry from the 16 percent of
the German work force which is foreign. Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note 79, at 288.
98. In practice, however, works councils do negotiate wages and terms of employment when
they are able to increase these over national minima. See Ramm, supra note 80, at 24.
99. "That the works councils inadequately fulfil their legally stipulated purpose as a form of
workforce representation was expressed by the wildcat strikes of Autumn 1969, and still more
clearly during the many unoffical work-place strikes in 1973." Miiller-Jentsch & Sperling, supra note
79, at 290.
100. 1976 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1976-Ger.F.R. I. The effect of these limitations is difficult to
determine: in coal and steel, where true parity has long existed, outright showdowns between worker
and other representatives are rare but not unknown. One study found twenty in a four-year period,
W. TEGTMEIER, WIRKUNGEN DER MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER (1973), summarized in
Hartmann and Conrad, in IRIP, supra note 39, at 236. This somewhat jaundiced account maintains
that supervisory boards are in practice preempted by "collusion" between top management and
works councils.
101. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Ruling of March 1, 1979, lBvR 532/77, 533/77, 419/78 and 1
bVl 21/78. A wry account of the decision, and the role of legal scholarship in it, is Heilmann,
Labour Law Research in the FederalRepublic of Germany: Current Status and Future Trends, in
TWELVE COUNTRIES, supra note 65, at 116.
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D. The Netherlands
The Netherlands represents in some respects the highest quantity of
labor law in the postwar period, for it maintained from 1945 until 1963
an effective wage control system under which wage levels were subject to
legal determination."t 2 The trend in the Netherlands in the 1960s was
toward diminution of the quantity of labor law; more recently, labor law
has increased. The two most distinctive features of Dutch labor law are
probably the continued practice of direct governmental limitations on
wage increases, and the rapid trajectory from a system of exceptional
harmony and consensus, close to corporatism, to one of unusual hostility
and discord.
The wage control system is sufficiently idiosyncratic to be worth a
bit of attention. It had its origin in immediate postwar problems and
perceptions shared equally in France, Italy, Germany, and many countries not studied: a desire by unions and management to reindustrialize
and reestablish a position in world markets. In the Netherlands, however, this was accompanied by a belief, shared by unions and management, that high wages would be incompatible with this goal, what has
been described as an obsession with national vulnerability, 10 3 and habits
of deference to governmental action, particularly when taken by ecofrequently
nomic and technical experts. These beliefs and habits are
°4
traced in the literature to long before the postwar period.
The legal embodiment of these forces was the October 1945 Extraordinary Decree on Labor Relations (Butengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen, or BBA) which, though intended as an emergency
105
control, provided the basis of Dutch labor law for nearly twenty years.
The BBA had three parts. First, discharges, layoffs, or voluntary quits
were unlawful without permission from government employment agencies for good cause shown. This was initially intended to prevent an influx of rural workers into the cities at a time when economic recovery
102. The highest quantity only "in some respects" since the Netherlands to this day lacks separate statutory treatment of employment contracts, which continue to be covered by three 1907 sections of the Civil Code, and also lacks any distinct labor court. Van den Heuvel, Labour Law
Research in the Netherlands, in TWELVE COUNTRIES, supra note 65, at 122-23.
103. J. WINDMULLER, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS (1969).
104. See generally Peper, The Netherlands: From an Ordered Harmonic to a BargainingRelationship, in WORKER MILITANCY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1965-75: NEW DIRECTIONS IN WESTERN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 118-121 (S. Barkin ed. 1975).
105. Staatsblad F.214; 1945 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1945-Neth.1. A small portion of the decree still
remains in effect, dealing with an aspect of unjust dismissals. Van den Heuvel, supra note 102, at
124.
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was thought to depend in part on agriculture. However, it soon became
a staple of Dutch employment relations. Second, the workweek was standardized at forty-eight hours. Third, a national system of wage control
was instituted. All collective agreements, at national or plant level, required approval from the misnamed College of State Mediators (College
van Riksbemiddelars) which could approve, reject, or modify the agreement, or extend it to cover otherwise uncovered workers, based on policies announced in advance. The policies were to be developed in
consultation with two bodies: the Foundation of Labor (Stichting van de
Arbeid), a bipartite council of union federations and employers' associations set up around the same time, and (following 1950) the Social Economic Council (Social Economische Raad), which included government
representatives along with employer and union representatives. Payment
of wages at other than approved rates was made a criminal offense. In the
early years of the system, prosecutions were frequent and employers oc10 6
casionally fined or imprisoned.
The national consultative role of the unions was further institutionalized in the Organization of Industry Act of 1950, which set up bipartite
boards with delegated authority to provide rules in entire industries. This
included authority to turn collective agreements into a species of statutory regulation. Strikes in protest of a decision of the regulatory boardsin practice, nearly all strikes-were ruled illegal by the courts.10 7 Some
forty of these boards were in operation by the late 1960s.
With unions thus expected to function almost entirely at the national level, new institutions of plant level representation were created in
the Works Council Act of 1950. It seems generally accepted that these
were indeed new bodies which owed little to prewar institutions of employee representation. The work councils were to be purely advisory bodies, chaired by the employer, who was to bear their expenses.
This system was quite effective throughout the 1950s. Union and
employer leadership were represented in the government and shared similar views on the importance of cooperation and economic reconstruction. Apparently, wage levels were usually set in the Foundation of
Labor and then ratified by the College of State Mediators; this permitted
the government to take responsibility for wage levels and the Foundation
106. Pen, The StrangeAdventure ofDutch Wage Policy, I BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 318, 319 (1963).
See generally J. WINDMULLER, supra note 103.
107. Akkermans & Grootings, From Corporatism to Polarisation:Elements of the Development
of Dutch IndustrialRelations, in 1 RESURGENCE, supra note 41, at 164 (citing legal studies).
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to appear neutral.'10 The effect was that Dutch wages by 1959 ran some
25 percent below levels in Belgium, West Germany, or France.1 9 Additionally, wages were highly uniform, linked mainly to measures of productivity in the economy as a whole and only secondarily to the industry
concerned."o
It is "easier to understand why the system broke down than why it
worked so well during the whole period from 1945 to 1963."' '1 By 1959,
government control of the economy had been progressively loosened until wages were the only matter under control. In that year, a movement
arose away from the uniform wage system and toward greater relationship between wages and industry or even firm productivity. This system
apparently foundered amid problems of defining and measuring productivity and worker resistence to what appeared to be wage discrimination
based on factors they could not control. Finally, "off-the-books" wages
were increasing and prosecution diminishing.
In August 1963, some of the larger employers in the Amsterdam
metal working industry announced that they would no longer follow
Foundation guidelines. Unions soon demanded large increases, and wildcat strikes broke out. In 1964 wages increased 16 percent, while an aston11 2
ishing productivity increase prevented any increased unemployment.
The transfer at the time of the approval function of collective agreements, from the governmental College of State Mediators to the bipartite
Foundation, turned out to be more than cosmetic. The foundation accepted every collective agreement submitted to it, and thus initiated free
collective bargaining, despite futile governmental attempts to get the
Foundation to observe guidelines. In 1966, approval of agreements was
13
once again transferred, this time back to the College.'
In this new era of wage determination through bargaining, the Socialist metalworkers' union decided around 1962 or 1964 to try to establish plant-level operations which had no statutory sanction. These were
to include stewards to reflect rank-and-file wishes which the union might
request. An increasing number of plants have been organized in this
108. Pen, supra note 106, at 320.
109. Id. at 329.
110. For example, a single agreement for building workers covered 250,000. Company agreements did not in fact differ from national agreements in form or scope of issues. See Albeda, Recent
Trends in Collective Bargainingin the Netherlands, 103 INT'L LAB. REv.247, 249-50 (1971).
111. Id. at 254.
112. Id. at 255-56.
113. J. WINDMULLER, supra note 103, at 321-27.
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manner in the 1960s and 1970s. 114
In 1969, the government, attempting to create a new structure of
wage control, submitted a proposed new Wages Determination Act
which would have authorized the Minister of Social Affairs to invalidate
contracts in whole or in part. The bill was adopted over strenuous union
opposition in February 1970. It further abolished the College of State
Mediators and granted the government power to impose a general wage
freeze. The enactment of such legislation over union opposition was seen
as a decisive break with the tattered postwar cooperative consensus, and
the two largest union confederations
(Socialist and Catholic) withdrew
1 15
Labor.
of
Foundation
the
from
Meanwhile a wave of unofficial strikes, which had begun in 1969,
grew steadily. In September 1970, a shipworkers' strike in Rotterdam
harbor over higher wages paid temporary workers ended with a flat 400
guilder payment per worker; this touched off a wave of unauthorized
strikes elsewhere to achieve the same payment. Many of those strikes
were without union authorization and continued after ostensible union
settlements with employers. 116 Rejection of proposed contracts was a
new element in Dutch labor relations and illustrates the gap between
union leaders and the rank-and-file. The 400 guilder increase became universal-the first general uniform wage increase since 1959.117
In October 1970, the government announced that it would not invoke the provision of the Wages Act of 1970 giving it the power to nullify
particular bargained results. The union confederations returned to the
Foundation of Labor. No consensus was reached, however, and a general
wage freeze for six months was announced by the government unilaterally in the Wage Moderation Decree in December 1970. On December
15, the two largest union confederations called a one-hour strike which
was the most widespread industrial and political action in the postwar
Netherlands.1 18
On January 28, 1971 a new Works Council Act was enacted repealing the 1950 Act and creating certain areas of mandatory consultation
(incentive rates and other payments not covered by collective agree114. Akkermans & Grootings, supra note 107, at 167-68.
115. 1970 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1970-Neth. 1. See generally Akkermans & Grootings, supra note
107, at 170.
116. Strike statistics are reviewed in Akkermans & Grootings, supra note 107, at 174-75. The
levels were not high in a world-comparative sense but were certainly high by Dutch standards. They
began declining in 1974 and were by 1975 again among the lowest in the world.
117. Albeda, supra note 110, at 257; Peper, supra note 104, at 133-34.
118. Akkermans & Grootings, supra note 107, at 170; Peper, supra note 104, at 133.
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ments) and others of mandatory co-determination (work rules, welfare
institutions, health and safety). The employee members of the council are
now permitted to meet separately from the employer to develop a common position. 1 9 In the same year, a new corporations law permitted the
works council to nominate members for the supervisory board, which
will be required of companies with more than one hundred employees.
In April 1971, parliamentary elections resulted in a new, somewhat
less conservative government which sought to improve relations with the
unions by nullifying the wage moderation decree retroactive to January
1971, and by announcing its refusal to use the Wage Law of 1970 to
review individual agreements. This appeared to be a return to free collective bargaining and a great union victory.
National wage negotiations resumed, but levels of unrest remained
exceptionally high, by now, under strict union control. The largest union
strikes involved the building industry in May 1971, and the metal industry in 1972 and 1973.120
The government fell apart over internal disputes on wage policy,
and new elections in November 1972 brought the Labor Party back into
the government for the first time in some years. The unions proposed a
"social contract" in which wage restraint would be met by governmental
expansion of services and some employer concessions on union organizational rights. This proposal was not accepted. Rather, the government
prepared and adopted in December 1973, a new Enabling Act restoring
government control over wage settlements. Meanwhile, strikes declined
in the face of the oil crisis of autumn 1973 and larger economic deterioration, and 1973 and 1974 agreements, bargained with government involvement under the provisions
of the 1973 Enabling Act, produced meager
121
wage increases.
Dutch labor law has largely been stable since 1973 with no implementation of the bargaining review provisions of the Wage Act of 1970,
nor any legislation on economic conflict or strikes, despite lengthy study
of the latter. In 1979, the Works Council Act of 1971 was amended to
require the council's consent to changes in shop floor complaint procedures, training, recruitment, dismissal, and promotion policy. The council's right to be consulted (but not veto) now extends to shutdowns,
mergers, takeovers, subcontracts, joint ventures and the like. The union
119. 1971 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1971-Neth.1.
120. Peper, supra note 104, at 134-38.
121. Peper, supranote 104, sees 1973 as a turning point in the decline of union power, attributed
to reduced tendency to strike, increased unemployment, and certain internal division in the unions.
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also gets information on investments and long term plans. The employer
no longer chairs the council."'2
E. Sweden
Sweden, like Italy, and unlike the Netherlands, has seen dramatic
increase in the quantity of labor law in the 1970s. A strongly-held ethos
of state nonintervention with labor relations has given way to significant
12 3
regulation of the bargaining process.
For the forty years prior to 1976, Swedish politics were dominated
by the Social Democratic Party. This continuity is unique among countries studied and has significantly affected Swedish labor law. Before the
mid-1930's, Sweden had the highest levels of industrial conflict among
Western European nations, and frequent state intervention into labor disputes.124 Over the following forty years, Sweden developed functioning
collective bargaining and a near absence of any disputes or state intervention into daily labor relations. 25 While activist in the areas of fiscal policy and welfare benefits, the Social Democrats were slow to regulate
labor relations. In turn, unions were able to achieve increases in benefits
through legislation that in other countries would probably have become
the subjects of collective bargaining. Industrial conflict declined sharply
in the 1930s and remained low until the late 1960s.
The embodiment of these understandings was the 1938 Basic Agreement (or Saltsobaden Agreement, after its place of origin) between the
largest union confederation and employers' association. Each group accepted the other and recognized procedures for the handling of grievances and negotiations. The unions acceded to the enforceability of
collective agreements and the channeling of "rights" disputes, over their
122. 1979 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1979-Neth.I.
A new health and safety statute was enacted in 1981, replacing a 1934 statute. See Van den
Heuvel, supra note 102, at 125.
123. F. SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (1962). An outstandingly
detailed study of Swedish labor and Swedish society is W. KORPI, THE WORKING CLASS IN WELFARE CAPITALISM: WORK,

UNIONS, AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN (1978).

124. For strike figures, see E. SHORTER & C. TILLY, STRIKES IN FRANCE, 1830-1968, at 333
(1974); W. KORPI, supra note 123, at 94-100. For an account of pre-1930's legal intervention, see
Edlund, Movements in Swedish Labour Law and Labour Law Research, in TWELEVE COUNTRIES,
supra note 65, at 46-48; F. SCHMIDT, supra note 123.
125. A useful historical sketch of legal developments is Edlund, supra note 124, at 46-55. See
also Korpi, Sweden: Conflict, Power and Politicsin IndustrialRelations, in IRIP, supra note 39, at
185. The decline in strikes from the early to late 1930s is probably internationally unique. See W.
KORPI, supra note 123, at 393 n.22.
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interpretation, to a Labor Court. 126 Strikes and lockouts were forbidden
during the contractual term. The negotiation of contracts was to be accomplished by the parties themselves.12 7 The unions also acceded to the
employers' right to hire and dismiss labor at will 2 ' and to direct and
distribute the work, rights included in all pre-1977 collective agreements
by order of the employers' federation to its members.
In subsequent years, the Labor Court won the acceptance of each
side.' 2 9 Managerial prerogatives were given a broad interpretation, and
the employer was given the right of first interpretation of contracts, leaving it open to the union to be the plaintiff in the Labor Court. On the
other hand, unions were mollified by the court's willingness to extend
contractual benefits to smaller employers not members of the negotiating
association. However, use of the Labor Court was never heavy and declined throughout this period.' 3 °
In 1969, Sweden began a seven-year period of sharply increased industrial conflict. The strikes were mainly unorganized and principally
concerned wage issues. While the proportion of strikers was not great by
international standards, it was three and four times what Sweden had

been accustomed to.131 The strike activity peaked in 1969-1970 and 19741975.
The Social Democratic party received one of its greatest electoral
victories in 1968, only to see its margins decline in the early 1970s. This
led to a rethinking of party strategy and a willingness on the part of
126. The Labor Court had been established earlier, in 1928, but the unions had formerly opposed it.
127. National negotiations permitted the unions to pursue a "solidaristic" wage policy in the
postwar period of attempting to equalize wages across job titles, gender, geography. R. MEIDNER,
CO-ORDINATION AND SOLIDARITY: AN APPROACH TO WAGES POLICY (1974).
128. This concession had been made earlier, in the December Compromise of 1906.
129. See Edlund's account of the lack of notice given his somewhat critical dissertation on the
Court when it first appeared in the 1960s, Edlund, supra note 124, at 58-59.
130. By 1970 the Labor Court decided only thirty or forty cases per year. Id. at 49.
131. Two unofficial strikes particularly clarified the issues. The first involved dockworkers in
Gothenburg seeking the reinstatement of two workers discharged for refusing, in violation of the
contract, mandatory overtime. The second involved northern miners seeking restoration of their
former pay differentials. The egalitarian bargaining policies of the union confederation (LO) had
reduced this differential by 20 percent over the previous decade. This strike lasted 57 days and
succeeded. Both strikes demonstrated the weakness of the LO in relations with the rank-and-file, in
not understanding local grievances, and then in being unable to end the strikes. In the miners' strike,
a union-management agreement was rejected by the strike committee, and the strike ended only
when management negotiated directly with a joint group of union officers and the strike committee.
P. SWENSON, supra note 92, at 84; Tersmeden, Swedish Unofficial Strikes, in LA CRISE DES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES EN EUROPE: DIVERSITf ET UNITt, LES RtPONSES POSSIBLES (G. Spitaels

ed. 1972); Korpi, Unofficial Strikes in Sweden, 19 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 66 (1981).
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unions and party to press for parliamentary legislation to meet the demands of the rank and file.
Several significant statutes were enacted during this period, three of
which will be mentioned here.' 3 2 In 1972, all companies with over one
hundred employees were required to have two members of the board of
directors elected by employees. 33 The union confederation, previously
cool to this idea, supported it in 1972 as part of a larger plan to increase
worker participation at all levels. In 1973, employees were protected
against unjust dismissal, contrary to the famous requirement of the constitution of the employers' association.
The question of industrial democracy came in for somewhat greater
study. A parliamentary commission reporting January 1975 revealed a
split between the Social Democratic party representatives, who joined the
employers and more conservative parties in advocating elected works
councils on the German model, and the union representatives, who advocated an increased workplace role for the unions. In March 1976, the
government introduced a bill along the unions' lines which was enacted
in June 1976 and went into effect January 1, 1977.134
The new Joint Regulation in Working Life Act of 1976135 represents
a fundamental reversal of understanding in the 1938 Basic Agreement,
and an equally fundamental rethinking of the place of law in Swedish
industrial relations. The employer's right to "manage and distribute the
work" is no longer exclusive; joint negotiation is made the normal mode
of enterprise decision-making. In the case of disputes, the union's interpretation prevails until contrary agreement by the parties or decision by
the Labor Court. Nor may collective agreements stabilize matters; new
negotiation or agreement may be demanded at any time, and on any
it is the local branch, not the
topic. Finally, as to all these union powers,
36
national entity, that is empowered.1
132. Others include increased protection for wages (1970); an equal opportunities act (1979);
the work environment act (1977). This output may fairly be characterized as a "legislative explosion," Edlund, supra note 124, at 50, and not merely in comparison to the preceding half century
without legislation.
133. 1972 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1972-Swe.l.
134. Korpi, Sweden: Conflict, Powerand Politicsin IndustrialRelations, in IRIP, supra note 39,
at 207-208.
135. Lag om Medbestammande i arbetslivet, den 10juni 1976. Translations are in F. SCHMIDT,
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 234-46 (1977); 1 LAW AND THE WEAKER PARTY:
AN ANGLO-SWEDISH COMPARATIVE STUDY 151 (A. Neal ed. 1981); and 1976 Legis. Ser. (ILO),
1976-Swe. 1.
136. F. SCHMIDT, supra note 123; Bouvin, New Swedish Legislation on Democracy at the Work.
place, 115 INT'L. LAB. REV. 131 (1977); Neal, Swedish IndustrialRelations:Act on the Joint Regula-

1990]

A THEORY OF LABOR LEGISLATION

421

This and contemporaneous legislation were insufficient to stem electoral defections from the Social Democrats, and in 1976 a conservative
coalition took office for six years. A nationwide lockout in May 1980,
perhaps the largest industrial conflict ever to take place in a Western
nation (in terms of proportion of the workforce involved), brought the
country to a standstill but did not result in new legislation. 37 The Joint
Regulation Act has been implemented, in part through national agreements in 1982 and 1987, and a flood of new cases in the Labor Court will
38
define it further over time.
There have been no changes in the foundational labor statutes since

the Social Democrats' return to power in 1982. Two new legislative initiatives in the labor law are: a long-standing proposal 1 39 for investment of
corporate profits into stock ownership funds run by unions in trust for
employees, enacted in "a heavily watered-down version" in 1983, 140 and
a Youth Law guaranteeing everyone between the ages of 18 and 20 a job
for four hours a day, typically in the public sector.' 4 '
tion of Working Life 1976, 5 INDUS. L. J. 237 (1976); Summers, Worker Participationin Sweden and
the United States:Some Comparisonsfrom an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 175 (1984).
On the whole, the Labor Court has interpreted union rights expansively. For example, the employer
must undertake mandatory negotiations before appointing senior executives. Decision of the Labor
Court, October 1979, summarized in 1980 I.L.O. Soc. & LAB. BULL. 171 (June 1980). See generally
Summers, supra, at 199.
Unions are also granted certain rights in the plant to carry on business under the Companion
Shop Stewards Act (1974).
137. W. KORPI, THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE 159 (1983). It concluded with separate
agreements of varying duration, widely regarded as signifying the end of solidaristic wage policies.
Svensson, Class Struggle in a Welfare State in Crisis:From Radicalismto Neoliberalism in Sweden, in
UNIONS IN CRISIS AND BEYOND: PERSPECTIVES FROM Six COUNTRIES 290-91 (R. Edwards et al
eds. 1986).
138. Research on the effects of the law is summarized in Svensson, supra note 137, at 296-97. He
reports little use of the law to change work organization; attempts to use the law to forestall closings
and mergers, for which purpose it has proved not well-suited, since the rights it grants are at the
shopfloor level and do not easily penetrate very high into corporate structures; employers becoming
more reconciled to the law; positive effects for employees in terms of better access to information,
stronger union presence in smaller firms. See also Peterson, Swedish Collective Bargaining-A
ChangingScene, 25 BRrr. J. INDUS. REL. 31 (1987); Fahlbeck, The Swedish Act on the Joint Regulation of Working Life, in 1 LAW AND THE WEAKER PARTY: AN ANGLO-SWEDISH COMPARATIVE
STUDY 145, 168-71 (A. Neal ed. 1981).

139. R. MEIDNER,

EMPLOYEE INVESTMENT FUNDS: AN APPROACH TO CAPITAL FORMATION

(1978)(Swedish version published 1975).
140. Edlund, supra note 124, at 54.
141. About 40,000 young people have received such a job under the law. Svensson, supra note
137, at 287.
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SOME QUESTIONS: TIMING, SUBSTANCE, AND EFFICACY OF
LABOR LEGISLATION

The changes in European labor law discussed above may be thought
to raise three particularly difficult questions for sociological students of
labor law: problems of the timing, diversity, and effect of changes in labor law. Moreover, such questions are not merely academic: workers,
union leaders, and managers would all presumably be interested in a theory which predicted the timing, substance, and efficacy of labor legislation. Is labor legislation something worth trying to obtain? How much
can be obtained? And if worth obtaining, how to obtain it?
The timing of the recent wave of changes would appear in one sense
to be the easiest thing to understand about them. Certainly the changes
must have been a response, in most or all of the cases, to a sharp increase
in labor unrest and recorded strikes; in some cases (the Netherlands, the
German Federal Republic, and Sweden) the first such unrest in substantial quantity since the Second World War. To point this out is indeed to
have said something, however, since there is no general linkage described
in the industrial relations literature between labor unrest and legal
regulation. 142
Moreover, noting the common origin of these legal changes in responses to strikes only deepens the mystery of their diverse content. For
the content of the legislation was diverse: union rights, union regulation,
works councils, wage regulation, regulation of bargaining, corporate
142. See however the interesting paper, limited to the U.S. case, by Donald Lee Berry, Political
Militancy and the Formationof Working Class Legislation (unpublished paper delivered at the Law
and Society Association, annual meeting, Amherst, Mass., June 12-14, 1981), attempting to demonstrate that: "Legislation favorable to the working class is enacted as a result of working class militancy, independent of fluctuations in economic conditions." Id. at 2. See also Ramsay, Cycles of
Control: Worker Participationin Sociologicaland HistoricalPerspective, 11 Soc. 481 (1977), treating
grants by employers in the United Kingdom of power-sharing or participation as concessions to
worker pressure.
The insight may "come naturally" if one has been thinking and reading about Western European
labor. Recall however that it did not "come naturally" in the discussion, supra notes 26-29, of why
there is no labor legislation in the United States. The "natural" explanations involved lack of consensus among labor professionals, not diminished levels of striking. (Try out on your friends the question of why there has been no U.S. reform of labor legislation and see how many of their responses
refer to levels of labor unrest).
A possible explanation for this phenomenon would be that models which predict legislation in
Western European polities do not work in the United States, where different dynamics obtain. I do
not believe this, and will address the applicability of the model to the United States infra Part VI.
Briefly, the United States appears to be willing to tolerate unusually high levels of unrest without
adopting legislative palliatives. On the other hand, it is absolutely unheard-of in the United States for
significant pro-worker legislation to be adopted in the absence of significant labor unrest.
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boards, privacy rights for employees. Yet, amazingly, none of the legal
changes overtly addressed the problem of strike control. And most of the
legislation-not all-could be characterized as a concession to workers
or their organizations.
Finally there is the problem of the effects, if any, of the legislation
studied. An American unionist studying the rich variety of reforms
might conclude that campaigns for legislation were well worth it. While I
will argue that this is the case, one's enthusiasm must be tempered after
one has studied the literature on the impact of the post-1968 reforms.
A constant theme of industrial relations literature was the limited
effect of the post-1968 changes. Study after study reported little lasting
impact of the changes. 14 3 While to some extent this conclusion followed
from the adoption of what might be criticized as a "command" theory of
law paying insufficient regard to the difficulties of studying the "effect" of
law on a "semi-autonomous field" such as labor relations, 1" even more
sensitive and sophisticated studies reported little impact of the legal
change. This led, in time, to a widespread sentiment among industrial
relations scholars that borrowing legal institutions was generally a mistake, rarely effective. 145 Yet the conclusion seems odd, for there seems
little reason that labor regulation, on the whole more recent and less ingrained than most other legal institutions, should be so culture-bound
and resistant to change. 146 So many of the background factors to labor
law are the same among advanced economies: all have unions and employers, a regulatory state, public and private sectors, laws and judges,
large factories, small workshops. Many work processes are identical and
the major employers are often identical too: slightly varying subsets of
the small set of prominent multinational corporations. 147
143. Supra notes 46-51, 57-60 (France); 71 (Italy); 91-96 (Germany); 134-136 (Sweden).
144. Bourdieu, The Forceof Law: Toward a Sociology of the JuridicalField, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
805 (1987); Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 719 (1973); Galanter, Justicein Many Rooms: Courts,Private
Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981); Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986).
145. This position is particularly associated with Sir Otto Kahn-Freund. See infra notes 162-68.
146. This now seems generally recognized. "The generalization that 'borrowing (with adaptation) has been the usual way of legal development is at least as true for labour law as it is for other
branches of law." Hepple, Introduction to NINE COUNTRIES, supra note 36, (quoting A. WATSON,
LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 7 (1974)).

147. This fact has gone ignored by American unions in their various struggles. It is one thing to
argue (as they often do) that employers ought to submit to a particular new way of doing things, and
another to argue (as American unions rarely do) that employers ought to submit because they have
successfully operated plants in another country, making the very same product, under the proposed
reform.
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In short, as Max Weber wrote:
What we are concerned with here is the fact that, once everything is said
and done. .

.,

modern capitalism prospers equally and manifests essentially

identical economic traits under legal systems containing rules and institutions which considerably differ from each other at least from the juridical
point of view.... Indeed, we may say that the legal systems under which
modern capitalism has been prospering differ profoundly from each other
even in their ultimate principles of formal structure. 148
The fact of national diversity in substantive law is an embarrassing
fact for theories of law which emphasize economic factors. This includes
most theories of legislation popular in American legal thought.

V. THEORIES OF LEGISATION
Oh well, we
Were meant to rest at this point so that the laundry
Of our thinking will be spread out on bushes and not
Come to tempt us too much with the long shadows of causality
Striking deep into its expansionist mass to let the bare
Branches form a tentative yet definitive icing or hair net
over its
Accidented terrain. That's how determinism does it:
Jack fell down and broke his crown,
And Jill came tumbling after. 149
It is not surprising that there is no generally-accepted general theory
of legislation. The idea strikes me as preposterous. There will always be
too many variables, political, economic, and social. The most the present
study tries to put forward is a suggestive theory of a very small sample of
labor legislation. 50
What is perhaps surprising is that, despite the hubris involved in
doing so, general theories of legislation have been put forward and some,
148. 2 M.

WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 890

(G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978) (this translation originally published in M. WEBER, MAX WEnER
ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 315-16 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954)).

149. Ashbery, Polite Distortions, in APRIL GALLEONS 62 (1987).
150. The only general theory of labor legislation with which I am familiar is Cohen, An Analytical Frameworkfor Labor Relations Law, 14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 350 (1961), which argues
that labor law reflects the interests of the politically powerful, and that changes in labor law follow
the occurrence both of a shift in political power and a shift in "prevailing ideology of property
rights." This does not capture the post-1968 changes, which of course postdate the article, which
were typically changes to favor the comparatively powerless. Of course, it is possible that the theory
is always true, definitionally, for if "power" were defined as the ability to achieve legislative
change-not a bad definition-then any legislative change would, analytically, reflect a power shift.
But then we should really have learned nothing.
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while not achieving general acceptance, have acquired a certain influence
in legal academia over the past few decades. I will review briefly some of
these theories here, namely, (1) Weberian or neo-Weberian models of legislation as functional adaptations to systemic needs generated by appropriate levels of economic development; (2) public choice models of
legislation as payoffs to interest groups; (3) cultural models which see
labor legislation as responding only to ingrained traditions (and hence
resistant to transplantation).
The current intellectual style in legal academia apparently requires
me to reduce all rival theories to rubbish, but I shall not pursue that
path. There is much to be learned from our current models of legislation.
It is also true that none of them fully catches the essence of labor legislation, so the field remains open for a fresh approach.
A.

Weberian Theories of Legal Development

I don't think that there is anyone who would deny that labor law or
legislation responds in fundamental ways to underlying forms of economic organization, which set powerful limits on the possible range of
legal variation. For present purposes, however, it is important to see that
the range of legal variation set by economic organization is still quite
incredibly large-vastly larger than professors of labor law admitted until recently. The aspects of labor law which vary from capitalist country
to capitalist country don't seem trivial, as the variations in labor law
discussed above should illustrate-they seem like the sorts of things
which ought to have major impact on the lives of working people, among
others. People who believe generally that law is limited by economic
structures-that is, nearly all of us-need a theory accounting for the
parts of law that don't seem to be. An interesting discovery of the Critical Legal Studies movement is that these people-we-simply don't have
5
any such theory.1 1
I argue here that the solution to the problem must lie in improving
our understanding of the cultural, symbolic significance of legal communication. Our understanding (as a profession) of these processes is quite
primitive, and in the end, this Article may be more of a programmatic
call for further research than any real contribution to understanding
law's symbolic roles. However, before following me down that road, the
reader is entitled to learn how national variations in law are explained by
151.

See Gordon articles, supra note 2 passim.
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other scholars who hold to more deterministic theories involving economic factors which vary little among countries.
There are basically only two possible explanatory moves here:
(1) ignore national variation in legal systems. Flatly illegitimate, yet
1 52
frequently done.
(2) Maintain the theory by holding that laws or legal systems do
converge, if examined from some "higher" level, typically functional.
National variation thus exists but is substantially irrelevant. For example, variation among institutions of worker representation, such as
elected works councils, informal delegates and labor unions may be explained away, as I just did, by treating these as equivalent functionally;
namely, the function of "representing workers" or "integrating the working class."
The second move is Max Weber's. Let's see how the master does it.
Weber was aware, to put it mildly, of national variations in the legal
systems of countries at similar stages of development. He invoked those
differences to refute the argument that law might be derived, in any important or meaningful sense, from a popular "sense ofjustice.' 53 So why
don't national differences embarrass a general cross-cultural theory of
legal development? Weber grasped the nettle at the broadest level. The
overarching systemic need was for stability and predictibility. So, for example, if English law could not achieve this through a German norm of
logically formal rationality-and the common law system, Weber felt,
precluded a very high level of logically formal rationality-it would have
to achieve predictability through alternative means. Weber mentioned
two: the central organization of the English legal profession (through the
courts in London) and the fact that the livelihood of all of them rested on
154
being retained by capitalists.
This sort of explanatory strategy is often encountered. For example,
it works neatly with the post-1968 European legislation. The story would
go that systemic needs for stabilization and integration of the working
class are met in different ways in different cultures. And of course there
are powerful critiques of this whole way of thinking which deny that
152. See discussion of the law and economics movement, infra Part V.B., a monument to
ethnocentrism.
153. 2 M. WEBER, supra note 148, at 883.
154. Id. at 889-92. I am reading Weber as consistent in his functionalism. See Ewing, Formal
Justice and the Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber's Sociology of Law, 21 LAW & Soc'y REV. 487
(1987). An alternative reading is that Weber is simply in deep internal conflict on this and other
matters. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (1983); Trubek, Max Weber's Tragic Modernism and
the Study ofLaw in Society, 20 LAW & Soc'y Rpv. 573 (1986).

1990]

A THEORY OF LABOR LEGISLATION

427

legal systems exist as discrete entities, or that they have needs, or that
law as we know it could ever be functional in the way the theory seems to
require."' 5
I have allied myself with the latter group in the past, but do not
want to hoe that row today. 156 Let me just raise a much narrower prob155. See Griffiths, supra note 144; R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1986); Gordon articles, supra note 2.
156. Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379. That
article criticized a variant of the Weberian explanatory move. Under the variant, societies, or sometimes legal systems, develop a need for something called "legitimation," which various legal phenomena, sometimes doctrines, sometimes institutions, sometimes rhetoric, can "fill." In the article I
traced the explanatory strategy back to Weber (and not, as often thought, Marx), showing that it
carries no radical political implications of any kind. Indeed, it breathes the air of a whole way of
thinking about law which radicals often (and rightly) reject: that there are legal systems, and that
law is typically functional in terms of the needs of those systems. (Robert Gordon, who has demolished the Weberian apparatus of law responding to "social needs," continues to cling, for reasons I
find baffling, to the Weberian term, though perhaps not the Weberian concept, of "legitimation." See
Gordon articles, supra note 2). I also reviewed the fantastic variation in the usage of "legitimation"
and suggested that for that reason alone the concept contributed to misunderstanding and should be
abandoned.
That Artible has come in for extensive friendly and unfriendly criticism, see M. KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 262-68 (1987); Friedrichs, The Concept of Legitimation and
the Legal Order:A Response to Hyde's Critique,3 JUST. Q. 33 (1986); McEwen & Maiman, In Search
of Legitimacy: Toward An EmpiricalAnalysis, 8 LAW & PoL'Y 257 (1986); Gordon, CriticalLegal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 92 n.85 (1984); Lempert, From the Editor, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 5
(1984); and has in turn been defended by Stick, Book Review, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 407, 417-430
(1988).
I have always believed, and said in the earlier Article, that some behavior is probably shaped by
ideology. See infra note 230 and accompanying text, on the indispensibility of affective or ideological
appeals for union organization to exist at all. Kelman and Gordon devote some effort to asserting
this. For example, Kelman has recently had sport with law-and-economics types who admit no
theory of human motivation except for narrow dollars-and-cents rationality, Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"Practiceof the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 206-23 (1988). Of course, such a flattened theory of motivation is
just about as silly as a theory of motivation that admits only affective appeals. Kelman has yet to
take on more sophisticated theories that model behavior as rational but define rationality to include
moral and affective appeals. See, ag., J. ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL
ORDER (1989) and Elster's many other studies of rationality; J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 51-72 (1983). Nor has Kelman identified a single empirical study in which a tendency to
conform one's behavior to law outweighed significant material incentives to disobey.
The real issue is not the concept of "ideology", but the distinctive role, if any, of legal institutions
and personnel in the construction of social ideology.
I also believe, and said, that legal discourse may contribute to the formation of ideologies, worldviews, consciousness, and thus alter behavior, too, even where unaccompanied by direct sanctions. I
also believe however, and tried to show in the earlier article, that legal theorists characteristically
overstate this effect, often grotesquely; that cases of law's independent effects are generally impossible to isolate; that at most law might occasionally contribute effects where it is consonant with other
systems of cultural communication; but that we know little about specific audiences as to whom law
might have this effect or specific legal communications which might; and, finally, that we shall never
find out about these things so long as we are beguiled by a supposed "legitimation" effect which is
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lem with the general functionalist explanatory strategy. As applied to the

problem before us: a positive theory of labor legislation-it seems to land
straight in the following insoluble dilemma: why don't the system's needs

(being met by law) lead ineluctably to legal convergence? To say that
England and Germany could attain predictability through alternative
means is not to explain why they would want to, if the underlying need
were real and each free to adopt the other's system. But just this situation

exists respecting labor legislation. Unlike people inz, the United States,
Western Europeans know each others' labor laws, study them, do not

hesitate to borrow from each other. If some underlying function is being
performed by all this labor legislation, why doesn't a "race to the top"
result in convergence on the system which "works best"? And if different
systems work differently on the ground, fill different local "needs," if you
like, then maybe the explanatory power of our economic variables is not
what we thought it was. Which seems to me to call out, as I have said,
for better understanding of the symbolic, the cultural power of law.

Pending such understanding, of which this essay is only a very tentative
first step, it seems premature to opine about how and for whom "law"
might be "functional."

' 7

B. Law-and-Economics: Legislation as Interest Group Payoffs
The foregoing skepticism about legal systems and legal functional-

ism applies particularly to the law-and-economics school, the ultimate
belief around these days in legal systems, legal needs, and functional law.
general to all law and all audiences, a thesis which, so far as I can determine, lacks any empirical
support whatever and surely has received none from any of my critics. For surely the evidence is
overwhelming, as I said in the earlier article, that most people know nothing about law, have a poor
opinion of legal personnel, and alter neither their behavior nor their beliefs on learning more about
law.
The instant Article is an attempt at just such a narrower inquiry: into particular extraordinary
circumstances (high social unrest, collapse of old norms) under which in particular social subgroups
(industrial relations actors) it just might be plausible to find a symbolic effect in legal communication, in part because of particular cognitive changes which someone seeks to bring about in a
targeted audience, using particular devices used to heighten the new law's salience. If there is anything at all to the theory of law's symbolic impact, which I of course believe, it must, in my view, be
anchored, in the way I am doing here, to particular circumstances, audiences, kinds of legal communication. Moreover, it should be expressed in a conceptual vocabulary free of such problematic assumptions as those which animate the usual "legitimation" discourse; namely that legal systems
exist, that law is functional, and that law importantly influences behavior such as the propensity to
revolt.
Now if such particular instances of symbolic impact can be documented, I have no objection to
caling them "legitimation," although because of the unhappy history of that word I personally shall
continue to avoid it.
157. Stick, supra note 156, at 420-24.
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As it happens, however, these people have a precise theory of the legislative process which exempts it from any charge of functionalism to the
public good, for it is always the public which loses in the legislative process, and some private group which gains-or reduces costs, if you
like." 8 This derives from political theorists of public choice or economists of regulation and in general assumes that legislation will pay off
interest groups, meeting only their demand for reduced competition, limiting entry, subsidy, or fixed prices.1 5 9

Now this also does not quite make it as a general theory of the entire
legislative process, and Jerry Mashaw has done a good job of showing

vast areas of legislative output (deregulation, environmental regulation)
and voter behavior which the theory does not predict at all.16 ° As applied, however, to the narrow problem with which we deal, the public
choice model contributes some interesting insights and questions. For I
certainly want to argue that the transformative labor reforms with which
we deal were indeed payoffs to insurgent working classes, though the
word "payoff" is not the one I would normally use. Moreover, the
payoffs were not necessarily guided by notions of efficiency or the public
good.
What the public choice theory cannot explain is the convulsive nature of these changes and the limited dollars-and-cents impact they have.
158. "The contemporary ethos of the legislative process is thus that it is fundamentally an arena
for pressing private claims. Both those who press the claims and those who assess them generally
understand their roles in such terms." Regan, Community and Justicein ConstitutionalTheory, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 1073, 1119.
159. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMrr. Sci. 3 (1971) is the
locus classicus. Explorations from the legal side, dealing with how to interpret such unsavory statutes, include Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983); Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-18, 42-58 (1984); Macey,
PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1982); Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983). A variant is the six-stage model of statutory
evolution toward "political cost-externalization" set out in Elliott, Ackerman, & Millian, Toward a
Theory ofStatutory Evolution: The Federalizationof Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313
(1985); this fails to account for statutory change which is sporadic and not evolutionary. Interpreting
or predicting labor legislation requires more a theory of statutory convulsion than a theory of evolution, but if the physicists can have both, I don't see why we can't too. An outstanding critique is
Kelman, supra note 156.
160. J. Mashaw, Positive Theory and Public Law (Rosenthal Lectures, Northwestern University Law School, Feb. 3-5, 1986). Mashaw also discusses the unfortunate effects on judicial discourse
of facile adoption of this view of statutes, and sketches out alternative ways of treating statutes as
"meaningful," other than as interest group payoffs. A small portion of these lectures has been published as Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understandingof PublicLaw, 65 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 123 (1989).
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Consider the pattern observed above under which labor reforms languish
legislatively for years, are resurrected in the face of increased unrest and
slammed through, to high symbolic, but possibly little economic impact.
This sort of legislation is not typical and seems to call for a model different from the quotidian subsidies purportedly explained by the public
choice people. In short, they too need a theory of legal symbolism, as
161
others have observed, and that is what I mean to sketch here.
C. Labor Law and Cultural Tradition
In a decade of sweeping labor legislation in Western Europe, nothing was more sweeping than the United Kingdom's Industrial Relations
Act of 1971.162 Nor was any failure more spectacular. The three years of
the Act's duration saw widespread noncompliance and resistance. Ultimately the legislation collapsed. It was substantially repealed in 1974.163
One of the many lessons that might be drawn from the story was
drawn by Sir Otto Kahn-Freund: that transplanted labor legislation was
in general doomed to failure. The 1971 Act failed not merely in the substantive values it advanced, not merely in the circumstances of its adoption; it failed-inevitably-because it borrowed from other (largely
United States) sources and ignored distinctive British political traditions,
specifically, what Kahn-Freund had earlier identified as "collective laissez-faire;" that is, the progressive and gradual elimination of
regulation.'"
Perhaps after the abject failure of the 1971 legislation, such a bracing warning was called for. Yet, when we lift our eyes from that experience, it is far from clear that labor legislation in particular is really so
difficult to transplant.16 5 In truth, it is the rare European labor legislation
161.
162.

B. ACKERMAN, supra note 22.
1971 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1971-U.K.1.

163. B. WEEKES, M. MELLISH, L. DICKENS, & J. LLOYD, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE
LIMITS OF LAW: THE INDUSTRIAL EFFECTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1971 (1975); A.
THOMSON & S. ENGLEMAN, THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (1975).

164. Kahn-Freund's most thorough development of the anti-transplantation thesis are KahnFreund, On Uses and Misuses ofComparativeLaw, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 20-27 (1974), reprintedin 0.
KAHN-FREUND, SELECTED WRITINGS (1978), and the general treatment of legislation in 0. KAHNFREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 24-47 (2d ed. 1977). The first appearance of the concept of "collective laissez-faire" is found in Kahn-Freund, LabourLaw, INLAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN
THE 20TH CENTURY 215, 224 (M. Ginsberg ed. 1959), reprintedin 0. KAHN-FREUND, SELECTED
WRITINGS (1978).

165. Critiques of Kahn-Freund's pessimism about transplanting include Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L. Q. REv. 79 (1976), and Stein, Uses, Misuses-andNonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L.REv. 198 (1977).
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which does not draw heavily on the experience of other countries, as the
stories above help show.'6 6
Kahn-Freund had very little use for labor legislation in general. 6 7
He was most identified as a describer and justifier of autonomous collective bargaining. And if one's images of labor legislation are dominated by
Nazi laws on the one hand and the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 on
the other, autonomous bargaining would look good indeed. KahnFreund's defense of British practice, during the decades of heavy criticism, gave rise to a great quantity of useful scholarship within the voluntaristic assumptions of the period.' 68
Disquiet with the assumptions of voluntarism does not necessarily
lead one to embrace legislation. Still, as my purpose is very different from
Kahn-Freund's, my reservations about his warnings decline. The struggles for legislation may be as heroic as the struggles to bargain, all the
more so when that struggle is really over cultural symbolic definition.
Looking at legislation in this light, clash between the political traditions
of the "borrower" and "donor" cultures may not defeat the efficacy of
legislation. It may rather be the occasion for its success-in cultural
definition.
The theory that follows aims to be consistent with Kahn-Freund's
skepticism about whether labor legislation may be transplanted. It does
this by locating the common features of labor legislation, not in its substance, which claim could not be maintained, but in the processes of its
adoption. While the processes of labor legislation are comparable, its substance diverges. There are, in short, significant cultural factors shaping
labor legislation in each national culture, and the theory aims to validate
these, and put them in their proper place-which is symbolic.
VI.

A POSITIVE THEORY OF LABOR LEGISLATION

Labor law in contemporary advanced economies, I would suggest, is
frequently, perhaps typically, a vehicle for concessions to disruptive
worker movements by threatened elites. Thus, I agree with the implicit
view of the industrial relations school that labor law is rarely the weapon
166. United States law reform is a different story, of course, rarely drawing on foreign experience. See generally Stein, supranote 165, at 209-16. For the labor law story, see Summers, supra note
33; Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American LaborLaws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394,
1458-63 (1971).
167. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 46 (2d ed. 1977) (1978).
168. This scholarship continues after Kahn-Freund's death; see, e.g., LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: BUILDING ON KAHN-FREUND (K. Wedderburn, R. Lewis, & J. Clark eds.
1983).
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of choice of a strong employer or capitalist class against a weak working
class. Rather, working classes which create enough actual or perceived
potential disruption so as to create demands for elite concessions will
frequently find that those concessions will come through the legal
system.
Thus, labor law arises not at random moments, but at particular
historical times of actual or potential disruption. While at these times
some concession to worker groups is indicated, the precise content of the
concessions is shaped by: (1) what, in any given culture, will count as a
concession to workers; and (2) what, among possible concessions, will
most commend itself to governing elites as a way of eliminating the present threat with minimum harm to long-range elite interests. The content
of the concession is thus shaped by national traditions of discourse about
justice and particular national power configurations, and thus over time
the accreted systems of labor will bear little resemblance to each other.
Finally, the anticipated effects of labor law change are generally quite
short-term and it is thus hardly surprising that although the institution
of labor law is universal, its impact is so often undiscernible and so little
of it appears functional.
I put forward this view with considerable trepidation. It is not a
general theory of labor law and leaves much unexplained. Nor does it
really disprove any other explicit or latent sociology of labor law. I hope,
however, that the concept of law as symbolic communication among
classes, a vehicle for concessions to insurgent groups, may strike a chord
with other students of legal change in advanced societies and perhaps
redirect study of that process away from certain common models which I
believe are excessively functionalist, ideological, or determinist.
A.

Scope of the Theory

The theory applies only to societies not governed by the working
class, but in which working people and their organizations exert political
power only in coalition with elements of elite groups. This has two implications for the scope of the theory. First, the theory applies in some measure to every known political system with organized workers'
movements, including, most particularly, self-designated Communist
countries like Poland or the Soviet Union. In fact, Poland in the early
1980s is a particularly vivid recent example of a threatened elite attempting, as an initial matter, to restore legitimacy through legal concessions
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to a workers' movement. 169 Second, the theory applies with varying
amounts of force, and applies best only to a middle range of societies-a
broad middle range to be sure-in which laboring or working groups are
powerful or troublesome enough to raise some threat to governing elites
(this excludes rather a great many less developed countries), but not so
strong as to rule absolutely (this excludes no present political system).
Since the theory applies with varying degrees of force, it is not a
general theory of labor law. A complete typology of labor law in advanced countries would include at least two varieties of labor law not
described by this model: the simple enactment by a working-class or
union-dominated party of its program, and "repressive" legislation not
designed as a concession of any kind, symbolic or otherwise. The first of
these types is found occasionally outside the United States; the latter describes some American and European legislation. Neither is as common
as the labor legislation described by the model, but both deserve a few
words here.
1. A Counter Example: Pro-Worker Reforms by a Pro-Worker
Party. Start with a pure type of legislation reflecting the working class
program. If workers actually governed the country alone, they could in
theory simply legislate their program into being. As this is purely a theoretical construct, there is no reason to discuss whether such a society is
possible;17 or whether such a working class would exercise power
through state legal structures or rather through other means, the state
somehow withering away; or whether in a real worker-run state elements
of some other social class such as bourgeois remnants or an insurgent
lumpen proletariat might extract analogous legal concessions.
If the pure type of workers' control legislation is theoretical, some
real world variants are encountered. The French labor law reforms of the
169. I mean only to be suggestive, here as throughout the essay. The proof of my approach must
lie for any country in localized research on whether legal change felt to people as I am suggesting it
might have felt. It is not easy to design such research, rendering all these remarks provocative speculation as opposed to social science.
Materials in English on the early 1980's legal reforms adopted as a concession to the Solidarity
movement include Brand, Solidarity's Proposalsfor Reforming Poland's Economy, 105 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 43 (May 1982); Wolff, Poland's Trade Union Statute: An Impermissible Violation of
Human Rights Laws, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 25 (1984).
Neither my theory nor any other would have predicted the subsequent repression of Solidarity,
followed by its acquisition of power in 1989.
170. See R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1958) (originally published in 1915). For a critique
as applied to the governance of trade unions, see Martin, The Effects ofRecent Changes in Industrial
Conflict on the Internal Politicsof Trade Unions, in 2 RESURGENCE, supra note 41, at 101.
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Mitterand period17 represent just this acquisition of power and subsequent legislative reform, and owe little to industrial conflict or any of the
dynamic I describe here.
One may divide countries into rough groups in terms of length of
political power exercised by working-class oriented parties, as Walter
Korpi has done in order to explain industrial conflict, but which, I would
suggest, helps predict labor legislation as well. Korpi argues that those
advanced countries which have seen a secular decline in industrial conflict in the postwar period (such as Sweden, Austria, and Norway) have
been countries where a working-class party has governed fairly continuously since the war, in which case: "It... becomes possible for the labour movement to influence distributive processes also by political
means." ' Industrial conflict has remained high or increased in countries with workingclass parties that have been excluded from power, or
unions excluded from governing parties, or both. In these countries, it
has not "paid" unions to change their "conflict strategies," so strike activity remains high.
To the extent a working class or movement attains an effective legislative power and uses it to implement its goals, one would expect (says
Korpi) a decline in industrial conflict and (I would say) a corresponding
decline in the frequency of the sort of labor law described by my model.
171. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
172. W. KORPI, THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE 168-83 (1983). The quoted passage is at
170.
Korpi's is only one of several recent attempts to construct a theory to explain when unions resort
to industrial action and when political action. These theories would predict when unions would seek
legislative change, though not necessarily when they would get it. Other examples include Pizzorno,
Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict, in 2 RESURGENCE, supra note 41, at
277 (a cyclical theory relating action in "political markets" and "economic markets" to cyclical
presence or absence of equilibrium in each); Offe & Wiesenthal, Two Logics of Collective Action,
originally published in POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY 67 (M. Zeitlin ed. 1980), and now
in Chapter 7 of C. OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM: CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF
WORK AND POLITICS 170, 217 (1985) (relating turn toward political action to internal organizational development of unions); E. SHORTER & C. TILLY, supra note 124, at 343 ("The main arguments of this book portray the strike as an element of working-class political action," rejecting rival
descriptive hypotheses); G. ADAM & J. REYNAUD, CONFLITS DU TRAVAIL ET CHANGEMENT SOCIAL (1978).
I took the strategic choice between industrial and political action by unions as the starting point
for a critique of American legal treatment of the latter in Hyde, Economic Labor Law vs. Political
Labor Relations: Dilemmasfor Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1981). Other recent treatments
of the legal status of union political activity include Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and
Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L.REv. 685 (1985); Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071 (1987). A call for a more politicized, European style labor
movment is Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform,
38 CATH. U. L.REV. 1 (1988).
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This does not mean that there would necessarily be a decline in the total
overall volume of labor law. Indeed, one would expect the working class
legislative majority to enact its program through positive law.
The transition from labor law as conflict control, to labor law as the
product of a politically potent working class, if it exists at all, must be an
extremely gradual one. Sweden is far from a pure case, since an arguable
working class majority of forty years did not enact labor law of any kind
until faced with strikes.' Nevertheless, I repeat that my model describes
not a general theory of labor law, but a particularly common kind of
labor law in contemporary industrial societies in which organized workers are powerful enough to resist, but not powerful enough to govern
without combination with other groups.
2. A Second CounterExample: Repressive Law. A pure type of repressive law may well reflect the desires of the ruling elite, unmediated by
any need to placate or appease workers' organizations. In such societies
labor law may not be symbolic communication at all, but may be frankly
repressive." This is not a theoretical construct but an historical stage.
There appears good reason to think that every advanced economy passed
through such a stage of labor regulation, when workers were poorly organized and labor law was strictly repressive.' 7 5
Even in advanced societies, one occasionally encounters repressive
labor law enacted by conservative majorities. For the past quarter century, the list is pretty much exhausted by the British Industrial Relations
Act of 1971;176 the group of British statutes enacted in the 1980s to curb
union powers and immunities, 77 and the Dutch Wages Determination
Act of 1970.178 Such legislation certainly aims to alter behavior of unions; it also fits the model described in this Article of attempting to project an idealized portrait of the nation's labor relations- here the
173. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
174. Schwartz, A Learning Theory of Law, 41 S. CAL. L.RPv. 548 (1968) distinguishes between
educative and repressive law. Surely repressive law is profoundly educational too, in its bleak way.
The distinction must only be relative.
175. Sorge, The Evolution of IndustrialDemocracy in the Countriesof the European Community,
14 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 274 (1976)(an ambitious attempt to link twentieth century styles of union
strategy to nineteenth century styles of state repression); Jacobs, Collective Self-Regulation, in NINE
COUNTRIES, supra note 36, at 193.
176. 1971 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1971-U.K.1.
177. These seem to lack comprehensive academic treatment at the moment. A brief narrative
summary is Towers, Running the Gauntlet: British Trade Unions under Thatcher, 1979-1988, 42
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 163, 167-71 (1989).
178. 1970 Legis. Ser. (ILO), 1970-Neth. 1.
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weakness of unions-so as to reorient working people cognitively. It is
not easy to sort out these two aims in the case of a sample of three,
particularly since the Dutch statute never went into effect 1 79 and the earlier British statute was a regulatory failure.18 0
From this limited sample, we can draw the following tentative conclusions. First, anti-union legislation is simply not very common any
more in advanced societies. Second, this fact remains true even during
times of comparative union political weakness and conservative governments. Third, it follows that governments responsive to employers must
have more effective means than legislation to advance their behavioral
and ideological agendas. The Reagan administration in the United States
illustrates this well. Labor's weakness was symbolized by the government's action as an employer (in firing striking air traffic controllers) and
in much rhetoric; neither agenda required new legislation. This paucity
of new legislation to reflect what was quite a salient ideological agenda is
simply another illustration of the general thesis of the weak "legitimatory" power of law; if it worked better, employers and the governments responsive to them would use it more.
B. Elements of the Theory
In this Part of the Article I sketch out the elements of the positive
theory of labor legislation. In Part VI, I illustrate it with application to
the countries studied.
1. Timing of Labor Law. The model predicts that an increase in
the quantity of labor law is likely when:
(1) a perceived upsurge in worker discontent or unrest leads to,
(2) a perception on the part of the governing elite that some concession is desirable in order to restore worker loyalty to the regime, restore
order, or simply "cool down" the situation.
This explains the convulsive quality of increases in labor law and,
particularly, the extraordinary fact that Western European countries uniformly responded to the 1968-1970 wave of unrest with legislative and
other legal changes. It does little more than restate at a very general level
a truism that law is frequently a response to perceived social disorder ok
deviance, which, at that level of generality, I take to be fairly unobjec179. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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tionable. However, there are several problems with giving operational
content to the theory which should be noted.
First, it predicts the timing of labor law only in a very gross way.
There have been several attempts to relate the rapid legislative and judicial changes in American labor law in the period from 1933 to 1937 to
levels of industrial conflict during that period. 8 1 These attempts have
been inconclusive, and I have serious doubts whether the operation is
valuable within that range of precision. Once perceived worker unrest
helps set the legislative process into motion, many other factors influence
its timing and it seems highly reductionist to suppose that month-bymonth levels of unrest would alone, or even importantly, determine the
timing of the law-making process. Legislation could still be said to respond to unrest, particularly if some significant unrest in the near future
appeared likely throughout the period, as was true in 1935.
Second, an increase in labor law should follow a perception of increased worker discontent or unrest by the governing elite. At times such
unrest is obvious. Unfortunately, however, the perception of labor unrest
is a mysterious process which is imperfectly correlated with the actual
presence of labor unrest. On the one hand, it is characteristic of British
writing on industrial relations to bemoan a supposed British obsession
181. Most accounts of the successful passage of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 49
Stat. 499 (1935), (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)), link it to the dramatic strike
activity of 1934, without any sense that this proposition is controversial. The strike activity included
sit-downs in Toledo, a general strike in San Francisco, and a national strike in textiles. See generally
J. HUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN LIBERALISM 161-71,
190-98 (1968)(quoting Wagner: his bill as responsive "to the serious industrial disturbances of last
summer, when blood ran freely in the streets and martial law was in the offing," id. at 192); P.
IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 204-215 (1982)(general account of internal debates in Roosevelt
administration; nearly every internal memorandum on the Wagner bill refers to labor unrest); Vittoz, The Economic Foundationsof IndustrialPolitics in the United States and the Emerging Structural Theory of the State in Capitalist Society: The Case of New Deal Labor Policy, 27
AMERIKASTUDIEN/AMERICAN

STUDIES

365, 381-86 (1982). The point is argued particularly

strongly in Ferguson, From Normalcy to New Deal. IndustrialStructure, Party Competition, and
American Public Policy in the GreatDepression, 38 INT'L ORG. 39, 86-88 (1984); and F. PIVEN & R.
CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL

107-47 (1977).

This account has been criticized in a series of articles by Theda Skocpol and her students.
Skocpol, PoliticalResponse to CapitalistCrisis:Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the
New Deal, 10 POL. & Soc'Y 155, 182-99 (1980); Finegold & Skocpol, State, Party, and Industry:
From Business Recovery to the Wagner Act in America's New Deal, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND THEORY

159 (C. Bright & S. Harding eds. 1984); Massad,

Disruption,Organization,and Reform: A Critique ofPoorPeople'sMovements, 27 DISSENT 81 (1980).
Their basic point is that the actual short-term response to the 1934 strikes was not Wagner's bill,
which failed adoption in that year, but the tepid Public Resolution 44, and that the adoption of
Wagner's legislation in the following year cannot be attributed to industrial unrest, which had tailed
off between 1934 and 1935.
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with labor unrest during a period when such activity in Britain was unremarkable either in an historical or international comparative perspective.182 On the other, a recent survey of industrial relations scholarship in
the United States pointed out a sharp decline in interest in the causes or
control of strikes from the 1940s through the 1950s, a period during
which the incidence of strikes had not declined at all.' 8 3 This has the
unfortunate consequence of making what was already a very loose theory
on the timing of increases in labor law even flabbier. For one thing, it is
not easy to quantify "perceived worker unrest" or to obtain any reliable
index of it.
Moreover, relating labor law to "perceived" unrest leaves open the
possibility that in any country (say Britain, if the British scholars are
right) there may be near constant perception of labor unrest; hence labor
law reform might happen along at any time. For research purposes, then,
one should associate increases in labor law with reported increases in
labor unrest, mindful that the relationship is considerably this side of
direct.
2. Content of Labor Law: What Makes for a Concession? Understanding labor law as typically a symbolic concession does not of course
permit precise prediction of its doctrinal content. Indeed, as argued
above, it is partly intended as an explanation of national diversity in systems of labor law.
However, several puzzling substantive elements of labor law become
easier to understand. First, if the function of labor law is to serve as a
public concession, one would expect to find enormous variation in its
contents, which is close to arbitrary so long as it will be perceived as a
concession. Second, what counts as a concession will very from country
to country and from struggle to struggle, according to the set of unfulfilled worker demands at any particular time, which in turn might be
defined mainly by intra-national "coercive comparisons."' 84 In other
words, variations which would be inexplicable if labor law resulted from
182.

K. WALSH, STRIKES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: MEASUREMENT AND INCI(1983) attempts to debunk the myth of British strike-proneness.
183. Strauss & Feuille, IndustrialRelations Research in the United States, in IRIP, supra note
39, at 81. The willingness of United States governments to tolerate quite high levels of industrial
unrest without legislative concessions to workers may be internationally unique. See infra notes 19496 and accompanying text.
184. Standard theories of union wage bargaining emphasize members' comparison of themselves
with other employees. See, e.g., W. ATHERTON, THEORY OF UNION BARGAINING GOALS (1973); H.
LEVINSON, DETERMINING FORCES IN COLLECTIVE WAGE BARGAINING (1966). For an account of
the historical forces which limited these horizons within national boundaries (and a plea, which I
DENCE
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the adoption by wise professionals of the "best" institutional arrangements for economic regulations become understandable. It is unlikely
that there are "best" importable institutions for the pacification of unruly
workers, since what counts as pacification will generally be situation-specific and probably nationally-specific.
It is true, as we have seen, that reforms in contemporary labor law
are very frequently precluded by exhaustive study by distinguished governmental commissions of international alternatives for reform. This is
hardly surprising. If labor law is to work at all-that is, if it is to restore
order and morale when workers regard it as a victory for them-it must
be highly public. Distinguished study commission, dramatic meetings of
high officials of government, employer and union groups, announcement
of proposals by cabinet ministers are the raw symbolic stuff of public
concession.
3. Content of Labor Law: What Limits Concessions? Although
most contemporary labor law should be seen as a concession to workers,
one should not lose sight of the fact that it is elites who are doing the
conceding. Following Korpi, one would predict that the model we have
identified, of convulsive changes in labor law resulting from conflict,
would be most typical of countries where organizations truly representative of the working class have been represented weakly or not at all in
postwar national governing coalitions, and conflict thus high.18 5 This
means that elites will retain substantial control over the shape of labor
law, constrained only by the need to offer a concession.
One would therefore predict that elites would, to the extent possible,
offer concessions which combine the maximum symbolic pacificatory
value with the minimum inroads on employer control. One cannot bear
down too hard on this to predict particular doctrinal changes resulting
from particular struggle. Sometimes only a real concession of managerial
autonomy will restore order. Sometimes elites may guess wrong, and
concede more than they have to. Nonetheless, with sufficient study, one
can identify an apparent hierarchy of preferred concessions which will be
made, when appropriate to a given set of workers' demands, and a set of
concessions which will never be made. For example, the entire set of
post-1968 labor law reforms involved no concession to labor of any conjoin, for more international horizons), see C. VOGLER,
MENSION OF CLASS (1985).
185. See W. KORPI, supra note 173.
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trol over profits, financial structure, pricing, or control of the production
process.
Instead, one can identify four broad classes of concessions which are
made fairly readily by contemporary employer elites faced with worker
insurgency. One is attractive mainly for its precisely symbolic value:
placing worker representatives on the company supervisory board.,8 6
One has high symbolic value but in practical terms inconveniences management relatively little: protection against unjust dismissal. 8 7
Finally, two classes of concessions illustrates the principle that,
where possible, threatened elites will tend to make a concession to some
institution other than the immediate source of trouble, so as to build up a
rival which might exert some control over the situation. Thus, when
pressure is being placed on management by spontaneous or unorganized
workers, concessions will be made to the union in order to build it up as 88
a
restraint on employee action, or simply to institutionalize the conflict.'
Conversely, when the source of pressure is seen to be unions themselves,
the concession is likely to come either to employees directly, or to an
elected works council, in order to create rivalry in plant-level industrial
relations between the union and works council. 89 Union pressure is likeliest to result in a concession to the union only when there are no other
plausible institutions of worker representation.
4. Effects of LaborLaw. If labor law is typically designed, insofar
as political pressures permit, as the smallest feasible symbolic concession,
one would anticipate limited direct behavioral effects apart from the
short-range goal of conflict suppression.
In a particular case, of course, pacification might require relatively
far-reaching concessions which actually alter managerial or worker behavior. However, the symbolism of an employer concession would probably be nearly as effective if enforcement structures or sanctions are left
murky than it would be if details of enforcement or sanctions were
spelled out or even stringent. Thus, one would expect labor law to be
concerned more with "rights" of workers and similar broad principles
than with finer points of providing effective sanctions for employer viola186. See supra notes 99 (Germany), 119 (Netherlands), 133 (Sweden) and accompanying text.
187. Estreicher, Unjust DismissalLaws in Other Countries: Some Cautionary Notes, 10 EMPL.
REL. L. J. 286 (1984), reprinted in 33 AM. J. CoMp. L. 310 (1985), discusses the modest form in
which most Western European countries adopted unjust dismissal protection.
188. "Guerilla warfare is not susceptable of effective regulation." R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND
CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 226 (1959).
189. OECD survey showing managers prefer presence of both union and works council.
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tions of those rights. Consequently, little labor law would contain the
sort of enormous sanctions one would expect to be necessary to alter the
ingrained behavior of organized groups.
It is vastly more difficult to determine the long-range ideological impact of legal change generally or change in labor law. The model is agnostic on this point. On the one hand, it predicts that the overriding goal
in most labor law is short-term pacification, the need for which is the
chief shaper of doctrinal details. Certainly then, there is little room for
planned long-term ideological impact. On the other hand, one cannot
rule out the possibility that repeated legal enunciation of rights or other
pro-worker concessions might "legitimate" a particular regime or order
by inducing attitudinal changes which would lead to increased citizen
loyalty, law-abiding behavior, and the like.1 90 Moreover, again over the
long run, styles and forms of state regulation of labor are bound to have
an impact on union strategy and organization.19 1
C. Applying the Model
To sum up, I have suggested that a common pattern or model for
contemporary changes in labor law discloses the following elements:
1. A governing coalition or elite in which direct working-class influence is
relatively small.
2. An upsurge in perceived or actual worker unrest.
3. A legal change which is highly public and ceremonial.
4. Consisting of doctrinal changes which grant some subset of salient
worker demands.

5. In a form which is considerably more assertive about the "rights"
granted or similar principles than it is about sanctions or enforcement
structures; the most common concessions concern grants of visibility to
190. Certainly many students of legal change profess to have found such a process of "legitimation." I have argued in Hyde, supra note 156, that such a relationship is most unlikely, in light of
repeated empirical investigations which reveal both little impact of diffuse attitude on political behavior such as law-conforming behavior, and little impact of legal doctrines or changes on general or
specific political beliefs. Certainly, the topic of the long-term ideological and behavioral impact of
changes in labor law is wide open for study.
191. See Sorge, supra note 175; Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989)(attributing weakening interest in political activity by nineteenth century
American unions to the difficulty in getting legislative victories enforced in court); Lothian, The
PoliticalConsequencesof Labor Law Regimes: The Contractualistand CorporatistModels Compared,
7 CARDozo L. REV. 1001 (1986)(attributing different levels of political militancy in Brazilian and
American unions in part to different regulatory regimes); Wallace, Rubin, & Smith, American Labor
Law: Its Impact on Working-Class Militancy, 1901-1980, 12 Soc. Sci. Hisr. I (1988)(purportedly
showing strong impact of NLRA, LMRA, and LMRDA on levels of strikes arranged by causes,
though not on aggregate level: NLRA encouraged organizational strikes; LMRA and LMRDA discouraged wage strikes).
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worker representatives on the plant level or on corporate boards, or protection of workers against unfair dismissal.
6. Which may increase the apparent authority or visibility of an institution of worker representation other than the source of the trouble: unions in
the case of spontaneous trouble; works councils in the case of union trouble.
7. Quite conjectural long-term behavior or ideological effects of the legal
change.
These elements are present, most quite strongly, in European labor
law changes of the 1970s. The fit is sufficiently good so as to suggest that
further empirical study along lines suggested by the model might well be
fruitful.
1. Poor Working Class Representation in Government. Labor law
as symbolic concession would normally be found in that middle range of
countries where labor is sufficiently strong to be able to disquiet governing elites, yet not so central to those elites as to govern effectively. In
such countries, one would expect labor law change to follow conflict or
unrest.
Korpi's recent study of labor conflict divides the industrialized
1 92
countries into three groups:
1. Working class parties came to power after World War II and
held it, perhaps as part of a larger coalition, continuously thereafter
(Sweden, Austria, Norway). These countries saw a sharp decrease in industrial conflict, as labor pressed formerly industrial demands through
the political process where it was strong.
2. Working class parties were in and out of power in the postwar
period (United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium). Such countries saw maintenance of prewar levels of conflict.
3. Working class parties either did not exist or were effectively excluded from national power (United States, Canada, Italy, France, Ireland, Finland, Australia).
The Netherlands and the German Federal Republic are deviant
cases for Korpi since they experienced generally low levels of industrial
conflict despite weak governmental participation by worker
representatives.
The model of labor law I have identified would apply primarily to
category three countries (including the Netherlands and the German
Federal Republic). That is, one would expect to find labor law as symbolic concession in countries with weak worker representation in govern192.

W. KORPI, supra note 172.
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ment and at times of high economic conflict. The generally low levels of
conflict in the Netherlands and the German Federal Republic are not a
problem for this model of labor law, which is more concerned with acute
than chronic conflict, so long as the rare outbreaks of acute conflict are
followed by legal change, which appears to obtain.
Among the countries in Korpi's categories one and two, only the
United Kingdom and Sweden undertook major overhauls of their systems of labor law during the period in question.
In 1971, Conservative reforms in Britain were certainly not primarily in the nature of concessions or symbolic communication, although
they did occur at a time of working class exclusion from power, and were
introduced with great ceremony after the report of a prominent study
commission, and did attempt to institutionalize union authority at the
plant level, which was in part a response to perceived worker unrest. The
1971 Act in Britain also contained, however, major repressive components much more typical of countries where labor is not only excluded
from power but sufficiently toothless so as to permit labor law to function
more as repression than concession. In this sense, the 1971 British Act
was plainly a "mistake." The British workers were emphatically not in
the unorganized state which would permit effective legal repression. The
massive union and worker noncompliance with, and obstruction of, the
1971 legislation led to its repeal; the entire reform episode is thought to
have had next to no impact. Upon reattaining power in 1974, Labour
repealed nearly all of the 1971 legislation, except only some of the elements of "concession," such as Britain's first statutory protection of
workers against unfair dismissal. It is not outlandish to treat the 1971
legislation in Britain as a total miscarriage, and the 1974 reforms as a
restoration of "normal" process under which labor law consists of concessions to workers.
This leaves two deviant cases. The less deviant is Sweden, where
protracted postwar domination of national politics by the Social Democrats did not prevent a reversion to the standard model of labor law when
economic conflict did break out. This may mean only that despite successive Social Democratic governments, worker demands were inadequately
politically articulated, and there existed a set of unmet demands to spark
brief conflict and the "traditional" response of concessions. I have indicated earlier my belief that Korpi's description of a worker-controlled
state, in which political administration effectively replaces economic conflict, describes more of an ideal type than any observable polity.
The spectacularly deviant case is the United States of America. The
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United States is doubly deviant. First, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 may
be seen, in light of the British experience between 1971 and 1974, as the
last effective labor legislation in an advanced industrial economy which is
wholly repressive of union power and contains no element of concessions
to workers. 193

Second, the United States is the one country in Korpi's third category, which despite experiencing rates of industrial conflict throughout

the postwar period which (until 1980) annually topped global lists, did
not obviously resort to legal concessions to pacify unrest. 194 It is possible
to view much postwar American legislative activity in employment law
as the extension of benefits directly to workers, such as guarantees of

participation in union affairs, civil rights legislation, and regulation of
occupational safety and health and private pensions. It is even possible to

view these and related statutory reforms as a major restructuring of the
effective American system of labor law away from collective bargaining,
and toward governmental setting of terms and conditions of employ-

ment.195 Nevertheless, industrial conflict over union financial corruption
or oligarchy, job discrimination, safety and health, or retirement income,
while not entirely lacking has never been of great enough importance to
explain the resort to statutory reform, particularly when unaccompanied
by any broader-scale concessions to employees.

The absence of legislation to build a rival representative model is
explainable. Since the United States lacks works councils or other institu-

tions of workplace representation apart from unions it has been difficult
to use legislation to build up works councils or other assertedly cooperative forms of worker representation. 196
193. I am assuming that the historical jury is still out on the long-term effect of some of the
Thatcher government's legislation of the 1980s limiting union legal immunities. See, e.g., Klarman,
The Judge Versus the Unions: The Development of British LaborLaw, 1867-1913, 75 VA. L. REV.
1487, 1596-1601 (1989). Almost any current issue of the British Journal of Industrial Relations for
the ongoing debate over whether Britain has a "new industrial relations." Union power has certainly
been weakened through legal and other means, but it is far from clear that the legislation will have
the longevity of Taft-Hartley. If this survives it will have demonstrated a new lease on life for repressive labor legislation.
194. On longterm trends in, and explanations for, American strikes, see generally P. EDWARDS,
STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES 1881-1974 (1981). Strikes peaked in 1980 and, with the exception
of 1986, have declined each year since. Measures of Strikes and Lockouts, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
313 (March 7, 1988)(BLS report).
195. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7
(1988); Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration'sGolden Age, 29 PRoc. NAT. ACAD. ARa. 97 (1976).
196. See however, in this context, National Productivity and Quality of Working Life Act, 89
Stat. 733 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 2401 et seq. (1982)), and Labor Management Cooperation
Act, 92 Stat. 2020 (1978), (codified at 29 U.S.C. 175a (1982)); both expressing vague support for
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Nevertheless, the conjunction of high conflict and low legal reform
is unique. The principle application of the model to the United States
(apart from the passage of the Wagner Act of 1935, as well as the earlier
Clayton Act, both of which the model would predict) may be to focus
attention on the really difficult question: why does the United States,
over its history, tolerate such high levels of industrial unrest? And why,
in a country where political concessions and indeed problems of any kind
are said to assume legal form so readily, have these high levels of industrial conflict not resulted in legal concessions?
2. Increased Worker Unrest. This is, as indicated, a relatively
weak predictive variable which is meant to indicate primarily that it is
comparatively unusual to undertake major labor law reform in the absence of increased unrest. Moreover, in each of the countries studied,
labor law reform did follow (sometimes by a few years) major increases
in labor unrest, and conversely, it is unusual for sharp increases in unrest
not to be followed by legal reform. More precise attempts to relate the
month-by-month timing of steps in labor law reform to levels of industrial unrest seem to me to ask more than any single factor can

produce. 197
The timing of the particular legal reforms studied is, however, more
than suggestive. French law, which had been stable since 1950, was overhauled in December 1968 along the lines of a statement issued by the
government in May 1968 which ended strikes involving between eight
and ten million workers. The French strike wave spread to Italy, which
experienced heavy wildcat strike activity in spring 1969, followed by
more organized strikes in several large northern firms and announced
union plans for major strikes in the autumn, when several important national agreements were due to expire. The government announced legislative reforms in June 1969, which among other things implemented
provisions of the postwar Italian Constitution which provided for union
freedom but which had not been implemented since 1947. The Netherlands Works Council Act of 28 January 1971, repealing the Organization
of Industry Act of 1950, which had been the organic statute of labor
regulation, followed rare strike activity in that country; specifically, a
major strike at Rotterdam shipbuilding yards in September 1970 and
smaller strikes which followed. Sweden experienced, in 1970 to 1976, a
cooperative programs such as "quality of work life" programs, but largely leaving the question of
their reconciliation with earlier collective bargaining legislation to the judiciary.
197. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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fivefold and then tenfold annual increase in the number of work stoppages, and a tripling of the number of workers involved over the 1955 to
1969 period; the Joint Regulation in Working Life Act of 1976, a thoroughgoing revision of 1920's and 1930's era legislation followed. The major German reforms of 1972 and 1976 also followed a sharp upsurge in
strike, particularly wildcat strike activity.
This does no more than clarify one particularly common pattern of
labor law timing. Not every strike upsurge induces reform, nor is every
legal change provoked by strikes. Nevertheless, the pattern identified is
more than suggestive. It might reorient industrial relations research away
from the question of "Why strikes?"-since strikes so often turn out to
be functional-and towards such questions as "Why strikes without concessions? Why concessions without strikes?"
3. Public and Ceremonial Nature of the Legal Reform. While
some sorts of legal change might be expected to slip through the legislature unnoticed-a tax break benefiting a few, or some increases in
prosecutorial authority-law which is symbolic concession would not.
This creates a problem, however, since most legal change is not particularly salient, especially to working class populations. Thus, labor law
change is associated with several relatively unusual devices to increase its
visibility.
France provides a spectacular example in that the nucleus of subsequent legislative reform was originally announced in a dramatic meeting
in May 1968 at the Ministry of Social Affairs, at a time when between
eight and ten million French workers were on strike. The meetings involved the leaders of the major union confederations and employer
groups, and the compromise-known as the "Grenelle" statement or protocol, after the Ministry's location in rue de Grenelle-wasannounced by
then Prime Minister Pompidou.
Another method of providing high visibility to legal reforms is the
appointment of a distinguished study commission of experts, whose reports become a center of political discussion. There may be many laudable motives in the creation of such a commission, but there can be little
doubt that it does increase the public salience and symbolic value of the
resulting legal changes. It is not used for routine administration, but then
labor law is not routine administration. For example, German reforms in
the 1970s were shaped by the governmental study of Co-determination
headed by Kurt Biedenkopf. Union calls in Sweden in the 1960s for
greater authority for worker representatives led to the creation in 1971 of
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a distinguished study commission, whose January 1975 majority and minority reports (Demokratic pa arbetsplatsen:Forslag till ny lagstiftning
om forhandling sratt och kollektivavtad) were a subject of much public
comment until the proposal of legislation (along the lines of the minority
proposal) in March 1976. At about the same time, February 7, 1975, the
French received the so-called Sudreau Report, the Report of the Committee to Study Company Reform, created the previous summer, which
included a number of proposals for increased worker participation and
profit sharing. British industrial relations discussion has likewise revolved to a great degree around the Donovan Commission Report of
1969 and the Bullock Commission Report of 1974, both of which proposed sweeping concessions to unions. As it happened, changes in government prevented either set of concessions from being carried out. If
either set had materialized, its salience could only have been increased by
the attention given the work of the study commissions.
4. Content of Labor Law Changes-Rights Without Remedies. In
the pattern of labor identified, reform represents a concession to workers,
selected for maximum symbolic value, and therefore likelier to be larger
on ideology than features which would change much industrial behavior.
A classic example is the reform of corporation law to permit or require some of the supervisory directors to be nominated or appointed by
worker representatives. This institution has been much studied; the invariant result is that worker directors are found to function as a helpful
channel providing corporate information to workers. They do nothing to
improve enterprise participation by workers; nor do they change the behavior of the board itself or turn it into a body likelier to consider worker
concerns or make decisions favorable to workers.19 Yet worker directors
have been the subject of recent legislative reform in the Netherlands
(1971), Sweden (1975), and the German Federal Republic (1976); they
would be required under a much-studied proposed corporation law for
the European Community, 199 and have been under study elsewhere.
198. F. EMERY & E. THORSRUD, FORM AND CONTENT IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1969);
P. BRANNEN, E. BATSTONE, D. FATCHETT, & P. WHITE, THE WORKER DIRECTORS: A SOCIOLOGY
OF PARTICIPATION (1976). United States experiences of employee directors have been mixed. A
prominent success is Pan Am Corp., where unions successfully teamed with other board members to
force a change in management. Pan Am, in a Union Deal, Ousts 2 Top Executives, N. Y. Times, Jan.
22, 1988, at Al. A prominent failure has been Eastern Air Lines, in which union board seats did not
translate into power against an intransigent management, which ultimately sold the airline to an
even less transigent owner. Eastern's Embattled Unions, N. Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1986, at Dl.
199. European Community Bill on Worker Participation, 113 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 368 (Aug.
29, 1983).
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Another theme of much 1970's legislative reform was the institutionalization of workplace conflict and the allocation of broad workplace
powers either to unions, an elected works council, or both. The legislation carried resonant names 2°° and announced quasi-constitutional
rights. Yet enforcement mechanisms were typically only lightly sketched
out, and sanctions for noncompliance light. As we have seen, few statutes
seem to have resulted in much short-term observable change. I fully
agree that the effects of this legislation were doubtless complex, possibly
ideological or normative, and hard to sort out. I would suggest that labor
law research might in the future be rather more devoted to these effects,
hard as they are to read, and rather less to the endless finding of little
behavioral impact.

VII.

TOWARDS A THEORY OF LAW AS CULTURAL SYMBOL

In the preceding Part, I presented a positive theory of labor legislation with significant implications for the timing, content, and effect of
contemporary labor legislation. Moreover, I have done so without employing any of the following explanatory concepts: legitimation, ideology, alienation, false consciousness. At this point, I might usefully stop;
positivists among my readers, if any, will surely want to stop here.
However, to leave matters at this point would leave the theory subject to serious misinterpretation. And so I would like to press on, more
briefly this time, to sketch out a little more about what kind of a theory I
have presented.
Earlier presentations of the theory revealed at least two serious
weaknesses. First, the theory was too brittle causally. It predicts labor
legislation where none has occurred: the United States, with its high rate
of strikes in the 1970s. It fails to predict labor legislation, or predicts the
wrong type, as in France and the United Kingdom. What can we learn
from a theory so easily falsified?
Secondly, the workers seem so irrational in this theory. That is, they
seem to settle for very little.
It seems to me likely that the answer to both these problems is the
same: that the social changes described must be understood as containing
an important symbolic dimension. And that this symbolic dimension,
while not fully understood, helps capture both the way in which the theory is and is not a causal theory, and also why legislation "works," in the
200. Italy: Workers' Statute. Germany: Works Constitution Act. Sweden: Joint Regulation of
Working Life Act.
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sense of being something worth settling for. To understand how this is so
requires an excursion into an alternative strain in the social sciences,
sometimes called "interpretive" or "hermeneutic" social science.2 °1 Unfortunately, this is a minority strain among historians and anthropologists and is essentially unknown among legal scholars.2 °2
So in Part VII, section A, I will set out some elements of interpretive
social science. In section B, I will give an interpretive account of the

passage of labor legislation. In section C, I will offer some criticism of
this approach. My goal is, if you like, a revised theory of "legitimation,"
though I prefer to think of this as simply a more plausible account of the

symbolic dimension of law than any we now have; one which does not fly
in the face of evidence but is consistent with what anthropologists, soci-

ologists, historians, and cognitive psychologists believe they know about
law and industrial relations.
201. That interpretive approaches are only alternative approaches, and do not supplant other
ways of knowing, is cogently argued in Rorty, Method, Social Science and Social Hope, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 191, 197 (1982), with which I emphatically agree:
The idea that explanation and understanding are opposed ways of doing social science is
as misguided as the notion that microscopic and macroscopic descriptions of organisms
are opposed ways of doing biology. There are lots of things you want to do with bacteria
and cows for which it is very useful to have biochemical descriptions of them; there are
lots of things you want to do with them for which such descriptions would be merely a
nuisance. Similarly, there are lots of things you want to do with human beings for which
descriptions of them in nonevaluative, "inhuman" terms are very useful; there are others
(e.g., thinking of them as your fellow-citizens) in which such descriptions are not. "Explanation" is merely the sort of understanding one looks for when one wants to predict
and control. It does not contrast with something else called "understanding" as the abstact contrasts with the concrete, or the artificial with the natural, or the "repressive"
with the "liberating." To say that something is better "understood" in one vocabulary
than another is always an ellipsis for the claim that a description in the preferred vocabulary is more useful for a certain purpose.
202. A serious weakness of my earlier article on legitimation, Hyde, supra note 156, was insensitivity to this competing model of social science. In particular, not every author I criticized was
making a positivist claim that could be falsified by the sort of survey data I used. That doesn't mean
that these authors escape criticism as "interpretations"-the interpretations may be flawed. I was
not, however, sensitive to the kind of claims being made, or the kind of evidence that would count
for or against them.
The interpretive approach is found among members of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies
but is almost universally misunderstood when employed; see Karl Klare's inquiry into certain forms
of legal consciousness in Klare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978), misunderstood by Matthew Finkin in
Finkin, Revisionism in LaborLaw, 43 MD. L. REv. 23 (1984), as if he were making conventional
legal arguments such as one would make to a court. See Klare, TraditionalLaborLaw Scholarship
and the Crisisof Collective BargainingLaw: A Reply to ProfessorFinkin, 44 MD. L. REv. 731, 748-52
passim (1985) for a discussion of method. My outline of the elements of interpretive social science
stems, perhaps out of excessive caution, from a desire not to be similarly misunderstood.
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Elements of Interpretive Social Science
There are imperialists among interpretive scholars as there are in

any movement,2 °3 but I wish to start only with some modest claims. 2" A
large part of the vocabulary employed in Part VI was "action concepts"

such as striking, demanding, conceding, publicizing, legislating. Application of these concepts requires more than the observation of physical
data. It also requires an interpretation on the part of the observer in that
she must interpret both the internal intentions, plans, desires of workers,
employers, government officials, and the social conventions and assumptions taken for granted as they act. This necessarily involves interpretation since these actions can be carried out using a variety of physical

behaviors, and conversely, the same physical behavior (e.g. throwing a
rock) may or may not count as "striking," depending on background
circumstances and the intentions of the thrower.

Now it seems to me fairly obvious that almost anything a scholar of
law might want to write about, including law itself, is similarly graspable

only through acts of cultural interpretation involving the decoding of
cultural systems of symbols. 20 5 "[I]t is impossible to have social relations
without symbolic acts."2 6
203. See the witty discussion in D. HOLLINGER, IN THE AMERICAN PROVINCE: STUDIES IN
THE HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS 187-88 (1985).
204. Here I follow B. FAY, SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICAL PRACTICE 70.91 (1975).
205. "Living in a society that extends well beyond our direct observation, we can relate to the
larger political entity only through abstract symbolic means. We are, indeed, ruled by power holders
whom we never encounter except in highly symbolic presentations." D. KERTZER, supra note 13, at
8.
206. M. DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER 62 (1966). Or as Cynthia Heimel, the "Problem
Lady," told a plaintive reader who asked: "When will long hair be okay again? When will society
start judging individuals on the basis of who they are, not what they look like?":
Don't be ridiculous! Society will never start judging individuals by who they are. How
can society tell? All society can do is look at your shoes, note that you're wearing purple
hi-tops, and figure you're a kinda fun, kinda goofy guy, maybe a little artistic. Society
does not have the time, the inclination, or the wherewithal to delve, to plunge to the
depths of your persona. Society can only make snap judgments by the visual clues you
exude. How much can you expect from society, anyway? Society is not your mother.
Village Voice, July 15, 1986, at 38.
While I do not expect these assertions of the universality of symbols to be controversial (but see
M. EDELMAN, supra note 1), it should be noted that this assumption distinguishes my account from
a classical Marxist one. The basic epistemological assumption of Marx was that people could have
direct, unmediated knowledge of supposedly material aspects of the mode of production. I K.
MARX, CAPITAL 163-77 (B. Fowkes trans. 1976)("nothing mysterious" about building a table,
which becomes a "mystery" as a commodity; other modes of production more transparent). See
generally G. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENSE 326-44 (1978). Unfortunately there is no historical support for this proposition, as Antonio Gramsci may have been the first
to point out in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 5-14 (Q. Hoare
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An implication of this is that a theory such as that in Part VI must
necessarily be at most quasi-causal, not causal at all, to adopt the terminology of von Wright.2" 7 Strikes or unstable governing coalitions (or
strikes and unstable governing coalitions) do not cause labor legislation.
At most, they create the conditions under which labor legislation might
be brought about.2 °8 So understanding the processes which lead to labor
legislation necessarily involves an interpretation: some sort of interpretation of the situation is bound up in the terminology used to describe the
intentions and actions of people. It is best if the interpretation be made as
explicit as possible, rather than simply lie latent and unexamined in the
descriptive vocabulary used.
It follows that a complete account of the processes of change in labor law must be a sort of ethnographic narrative-"thick description," in
Geertz's phrase29--capturing, as much as possible, the background assumptions, intentions, shared and not shared social meanings, which inform the actions of those in the process. Moreover, this description must
employ the "juicy," evaluative terms in which subjects can recognize
themselves and in which policy can be formulated; the "sterile jargon of
'quantified' social sciences" will neither capture the human experience
nor assist intelligent reflection on it.21 0 Fortunately, it is not necessary to
invent this genre; there is now a sizable literature of work by ethnographers, and more recently historians of political and legal processes,
which can guide our methodological groping.2 1 1 The sort of investigation
I have in mind involves: (1) thorough description of the relevant public
life;212 (2) interviews with small samples of cultural participants, to learn
& G. Smith eds. 1971) (inevitability of intellectual mediation between individual and economy). See
also id. at 404-07 (historicity of Marxist approaches).
207. G. HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING, 83-164 (1971).
208. "[I]n these sorts of conditionship relations, consciousness functions as a mediator between
the determining antecedent factors and the subsequent action; in other words, men act in terms of
their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their external conditions, rather than by being governed directly by them, and therefore these conditions must be understood not as causes but as
warranting conditions which make a particular action or belief more 'reasonable', 'justified', or 'appropriate', given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors." B. FAY, supra note 204, at 8485.
209. C. GEERTZ, supra note 9, at 3-30.
210. Rorty, supra note 201, at 196.
211. I will be citing some of the best of these studies in the pages ahead, but I should mention
Thompson, PatricianSociety, Plebian Culture, 7 J. Soc. HIsT. 382 (1974), as in many ways, the
model for my understanding of the relationship between state theater and class struggles. I first read
this essay years after the early drafts of this Article and was immediately struck that I had discovered the source of so many ideas which were "in the air" when I first began thinking about the
problem.
212. "[C]osmologieal conceptions are not merely-or even importantly-to be understood in
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their accounts of what is going on, and (3) self-examination as to the
influences of one's own culture. The present Article represents only a
fragment of the first, along with the third, of these.

Two objections immediately occur. First, what, if any limits govern
the interpretive process? If I want to see in the process of labor legislation
the progressive unfolding of reason, while you see endless class struggle
over the control of the means of production, and she sees the struggle of
consciousness to overcome the self/other dichotomy, does anything constrain our choice of interpretation? Or is it necessarily the case with interpretive social science that anything goes?

I regard this as a telling objection to a great deal of what goes on in
the name of interpretive social science.21 3 However, I do not believe it is
an insurmountable objection to the entire school. The interpretation
must always be "one which reveals to people what it is that they and
others are doing when they act and speak as they do.""' 4 It must, in
other words, increase "the possibility of communication between those

who come into contact with the accounts of such a science and those
whom it studies."2 5 Thus,
for an interpretive social science, only that which is validated as conceivable
or likely by the object of study as a possibly true account of what he is
doing can be counted as true, which means to say that only when both the
observer and the actor ultimately come to talk about the actions and beliefs
of the actor in the same way is it possible to claim that a correct account
has been given.216
terms of the subjects' stated 'beliefs'. . . but are most richly embedded in myths, rituals, legal codes,
constitutional charters, and other collective representations." S. TAMBIAH, supra note 13, at 129
(emphasis supplied).
213. See Gilbert, The Medici Megopolis (Book Review), 28 N.Y. R.v.Booxs 62-66 (Jan. 21,
1982).

214. B. FAY, supra note 204, at 79.
215. Id. at 80.
216. Id. at 82. A historian cannot exactly check her interpretations out with those she studies,
but can impose analogous limitations on her work. See Thompson, supra note 33. A defense of a
similar stance of a "dialogical" conception of historical inquiry, sensitive to its plurality of voices, is
D. LACAPRA, HISTORY AND CRITICISM (1985).
The use of dialog as a limit on interpretation is not merely a methodological nicety to avoid selfindulgent interpretation. It is absolutely necessary if the researcher is not merely an interpretive
social scientist but a critical social scientist as well. For critical social science, a status I woluld claim
for this Article, must not merely expose oppressive features of a society but must do so in such a way
as to stimulate the audience to transform it. See generally B. FAY, CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: LIBERATION AND ITS LIMITS 85-140 (1987), with which I am happy to ally myself on matters methodological and strategic.
A defect of so much work employing models of legitimation is an excessive self-confidence on the
part of the researcher that the communication of historically subordinate people or classes represents
"consent" or "submission" rather than complex mediations, even rebellion. For what must be the
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Now I have not followed this methodological stricture here. I have
presented and will present what I am pleased to consider an interpreta-

tion of labor legislation which I have not shared in a tavern with a
French or Swedish worker. I readily confess that this is a serious weakness of this study, and that such validating dialogue must be the necessary next step. It is simply autobiographically the case that I arrived at
this interpretation through comparative study, and that the interpreta-

tion seems helpful enough to me to offer it to the world at this point. In
drafting it, I have constantly confronted Fay's dicta, and tried to produce
only an interpretation which might be acceptable as true to the object of
study. But if I or another investigator discover that this interpretation is
not acceptable to the actors, that finishes it as an interpretation, as far as
I am concerned.2 17
A second and related objection is one of professional competence.
Legal scholars are rarely trained ethnographers or historians. What leads
us to think that we have any insight whatever into the complex web of
social interactions which ripple out and around from legal phenomena?
My response is that legal scholars may be an especially good source
of interpretations of legal phenomena. This requires an understanding of
the sort of activity which has come to be the subject of interpretive social
science.
Interpretive social science holds its greatest advantage over the more
quantifiable kinds when it comes to dealing with unspoken matters of

cultural consensus.218 These sorts of regularities often elude survey retheoretical maximum of this distasteful interpretation, see M. BURAWOY, THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTION: FACTORY REGIMES UNDER CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM (1985), and M. BuRAwOY,
MANUFACTURING CONSENT: CHANGES IN THE LABOR PROCESS UNDER MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

(1979), in which nearly everything is so interpreted. For a general critique, see the powerful parable
of the Grandfather and the Elevator in Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perilsand Promise
of CriticalLegal Theoryfor Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 103, 104-13 (1987).
217. An interpretation can of course be one which never occurred to the actor. Freud's and
Marx's are classic examples. "Weberians do not suggest that social actions are what individual actors
say they are! A social action is what the community takes it to be; only thus is it effective in creating
a social world." Harr6, Accountingfor Social Realty (Book Review), The Times (London) Lit. Supp.
399 (Apr. 11, 1986). But I do insist that a plausible interpretation must be one of which the actor
might, ultimately, rationally become convinced.
218. A recurrent experience of ethnographers is that they are dealing with shared, individual phenomena, that culture represents a consensus on a wide variety of meanings
among members of an interacting community approximating that of the consensus on
language among members of a speech-community....
.. [E]very human community functions with a group consensus about the meanings
of the symbols used in the communications that constitute their social life, however
variable their behavior and attitudes in other respects, because such a consensus is as
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search, but are often of the greatest interest for interpretive accounts.

Moreover, if the consensus is real, a large number of informants is not
necessary; in-depth interviews with a small number of informants-including the researcher herself, as to her own culture-may reveal all that
is necessary as to the cultural meaning of various symbols.2 19 In such a
search then-for basic cultural consensus-the best researcher or eth-

nographer may be the sensitive member of the local culture.22 °

necessary for encoding and decoding messages in social communication in general as
agreement about speech rules is to encoding and decoding in the linguistic mode.
LeVine, Properties of Culture: An Ethnographic View, in CULTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND,
SELF, AND EMOTION 67, 68-69 (R. Shweder & R. Levine eds. 1984).
Levine illustrates the point with reference to his own field work on witchcraft among the Gusii of
Kenya. "I discovered that Gusii accounts of personal experience with witches were in fact highly
predictable in the social situations of their ocurrence, the images of witches and victims, the narrative sequences of action, the emotional reactions attributed to self and others, and the outcomes of
attempts to combat witchcraft. These were the most intense emotional experiences reported by my
friends and neighbors about themselves and their immediate families, yet the form and contents of
their reports were standardized, apparently following a conventional scripts with a single set of
symbols and meanings." Id. at 71.
I have no doubt that similar conventional scripts, though somewhat less standardized, attend the
descriptions by working people of the experience of labor conflict. For unintentional confirmation,
see R. FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND CONTEMPORARY

AMERICAN WORKERS (1988), a detailed ethnographic study of a contemporary wildcat strike, organizing campaign, and economic strike ending in the decertification of the union. Fantasia's informants, like LeVine's, maintained both that these were intense emotional experiences which had
completely altered their lives, and yet their descriptions have a similar "standardized" quality which
reveals much about the "scripts" governing contemporary industrial relations.
219. The point is powerfully illustrated in Pollner, Mundane Reasoning, 4 PHIL. Soc. Scd. 35
(1974), an inquiry into those aspects of observation which assume unanimity among all similarlysituated observers. Pollner observed municipal traffic courts, and especially ways in which defendants explained [away?] what the officer saw and what the defendant denies. The norms governing the
occasion powerfully reinforce the assumption that anyone "not blind or crazy" "sees" the same
thing, so that someone who "sees" something different, and cannot be accused of blindness or craziness, must be positioned in a place where he could not have seen well, or confused two incidents, or
the like. "Each explanation preserves the world as an objective and shared order of events by showing how unanimity would have been forthcoming had it not been for the absence, failure, or violation
of one of the presupposed but previously unformulated conditions necessary for unanimity." Id. at
52. An interesting interpretation of this research as revealing fundamental conditions for the existence of communication communities is I J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 13-15 (1984).
220. Compare the new school of "postmodernist" anthropology, denying any privileged status
to the ethnographer's point of view; enjoying a multiplicity of narratives; and suggesting that the
chief value of ethnography is in challenging and disturbing assumptions of the ethnographer's own
culture. J. CLIFFORD & G. MARCUS, WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (1986); G. MARCUS & M. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE: AN
EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT INTHE HUMAN SCIENCES (1986). The latter book contains an approving
reference to some of the interpretive ethnographies of the legal system produced by the Critical
Legal Studies Movement as a model for the sort of interpretation envisioned. G. MARCUS & M.
FISCHER supra, at 154.
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This starting point may or may not make a place for a "native,"
nontrained, ethnographer. But it does not seem to make a place at all for
a legal ethnographer. For I have argued, and the point now seems to me
beyond argument, that legal communications (statutes and judgments),
institutions, and personnel do not play a significant, salient, or interesting
role in shaping ordinary, everyday "mundane reasoning" in our culture.2 21 Or at least, they do so only when heavily reinforced by other
221. Hyde, supra note 156. One of my critics, for example, has put forward the example of the
cultural understanding of the employer's 'right' to tell the employee what to do," suggesting that
this rests on "the core concepts of liberal property and contract law: The employer 'owns' the business and so she or he can dictate the terms of access to her or his resources; the employee (impliedly)
'agreed' to submit to the employer's direction." Gordon, CurrentDebate/CriticalLegal Studies: A
Response, 3 TIKKUN (No. 5) 89, 90 (Sep./Oct. 1988). This sounds like a plausible sort of dialog, but
it is very far from demonstrating the cultural importance of legal concepts or institutions. Ideas as
general as these correspond not only to legal ideas, but also to fundamental ideas of liberal political
philosophy, American political culture, favorite parables of American Protestantism at various times
in its history. The employer's speech has been molded and reinforced by so many cultural stimuli
that it is difficult to imagine that legal institutions or personnel have played much of a role. Indeed,
the ideas are "legal" concepts only under a somewhat imperialistic definition of "legal concepts;"
they are so generally accepted in our society that they concern lawyers little in their day-to-day
work. They function much more as the kinds of cultural consensus which the anthropologists cited
above are interested in.
Gordon, I suppose, would accept much of this, and the differences between us largely stem from
the different purposes we have. Cf Rorty, supra note 201. He wants legal education and discourse to
be alive to these unexamined assumptions, and so do I. He wants legal discourse to take on these
assumptions, not artificially limit itself to "professional" problems in contract and property law, and
so do I. He wants law students to be alive to the cultural and symbolic aspects of their work, and so,
of course, do I; it is a major theme of this essay. For all these concepts, the "imperialistic" conception of law is helpful.
Gordon and I part company-though really not by much-when I am working on the problem of
this Article, which has occupied me so long: the nature and effects of social movements which result
in changes in labor legislation. Understanding those effects is a very tricky process. A model of
legitimation, which carries with it such assumptions as the high salience of legal institutions or some
inherent tendency in the population to conform to legal norms, is simply-no help at all in grasping
the dynamics. There is absolutely nothing in the literature on the Western European reforms of the
1970s which suggests the slightest "legitimation" effect of these reforms; few workers can even be
persuaded to discuss them.
Of course one can go to court proceedings and observe the cultural understandings manifested,
see Pollner, supranote 219; see also E. SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING

OF THE WORLD 296-307 (1985) (interpretation of the narratives and assumptions employed in products liability trials). But this does not mean that these understandings were created by, or distinctive
to, legal institutions. The assumption of the world as objective and shared, identified by Pollner,
surely transcends the context of traffic court where he chose to observe it.
Closer to the model of legitimation are the assumptions about the moral responsibilities of creators of objects, identified by Scarry as dramatized in products liability trials. People probably do not
walk around the street with any sort of notion of "the moral responsibility of creators of objects" and
normally are called on to clarify their attitudes on this question only in the context of jury trials. So
the distinctively legal modes of presentation so brilliantly analyzed by Scarry (repetition of narrative,
counterfactuals) probably are highly significant in shaping jurors' thought processes and behavior. In
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sorts of cultural communication, and only in the same way that diffuse
cultural communication does reinforce consensus.
Where legal communication does become important, I believe I have
shown, is in "crisis" conditions when old consensus has broken down
and other cultural forces cannot generate a new basis for social interaction.22 2 In these circumstances, the ethnographer sensitive to legal communication has a story to tell, not because that story is privileged or the
master story, but because it is a story, and no other story is privileged in
the sense of representing some social consensus. In fact, this seems to me
to be perhaps the greatest social science contribution which legallytrained academics can make: not to be second-rate followers of another
discipline, but first-rate interpreters and observers of their own.
B. An Interpretation of Labor Legislation
Let us begin with the values of Western working classes. It has become conventional to speak of a "dual consciousness" combining elements of acceptance and rejection, in odd mixture. It is quite misleading
to speak simply of their acceptance of a "dominant ideology" of managerial capitalism or their subordinate position within it.
[W]orkers will often agree with dominant elements, especially when these
are couched as abstract principles or refer to general situations, which is
normally the case in interview surveys using standardised questionnaires,
but will then accept deviant values when they themselves are directly involved or when these are expressed in concrete terms which correspond to
everyday reality.2 23
other words, if you like, here legal systems do "legitimate" certain ways of thinking and behaving, if
I do say so myself (Scarry doesn't use the word).
The problem here is in determining whether the attitudes and behaviors so "legitimated" would
ever manifest themselves outside the trial context. For example, do jurors exposed to these narratives
think or behave differently the next time they buy something at the hardware store that doesn't
work? Do they argue differently in discussions among friends about what to do about defective
products, or reform of the tort system? Does any mechanism exist for diffusing the experience of
tort-case jurors out into the larger culture? Scarry is not particularly interested in these questions,
but she provides no reason to think that the answer to any of them is "yes."
222. There may well be other circumstances when legal communication becomes an effective
shaper of cultural symbolic understanding: other circumstances, other populations. Surely there are
such circumstances. But these must be identified retail, not wholesale. Given the low salience of legal
institutions, the low popular opinion (in our culture) of legal personnel, and the low rates of behavioral compliance with law unaccompanied by sanctions, it would have to be unusual circumstances
in which law could play this role, and the law would have to be accompanied by unusual devices to
heighten its salience.
223. N. ABERCROMBIE, S. HILL, & B. TURNER, THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY THESIS 141
(1980)(reviewing literature). See also Mann, The Social Cohesion of LiberalDemocracy, 35 AM. Soc.
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Blue-collar informants do not hesitate to reject substantial elements of
the ideology of private property and distinguish sharply between what
they expect and what they consider just.2 24
This "dual consciousness" has, it turns out, a substantial cognitive
component. These blue-collar workers are indeed willing to reject substantial elements of dominant ideology-they are much more liberaland do not characteristically blame themselves for their subordinate position. But when they specify visions of justice which they do not expect to
achieve, these visions "did not depart radically from current industrial
'225
pay norms.
Cognitive research has found that, even when asked to imagine an idealized
world, people generally do not stray far from what they already know. If
this explanation is correct, then it may be possible to enlarge visions of
justice through participation in small experiments that demonstrate alternative ways of distributing economic outcomes. In this context, small scale
innovations (such as communes, employee ownership plans, and charitable
drives) seem less quixotic in their often short-lived isolation. Perhaps people
must live through an alternative before they can envision it on a larger
scale.2 26
Under the right circumstances, labor legislation can do on a large
scale what "small scale innovations" can only do partially: get industrial
actors to live through alternative forms of work organization and thereby
overcome cognitive and imaginative barriers to participation. But before
seeing how this is done, it would be wrong to leave the impression that
only managers or political elites have any stake in this process. For the
unions' organizational need for labor legislation is even more pressing,
and chronic.
If union appeals to organize were limited to the economically raREV. 423 (1970)oittle "value consensus" between workers and dominant classes in United States or
United Kingdom, and what there is characteristically overstated in literature).
224. Martin, When Expectations and Justice Do Not Coincide: Blue-Collar Visions of a Just
World, in JUSTICE IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 317 (H. Bierhoff, R. Cohen, & J. Greenberg eds. 1986)
[hereinafter JUSTICE]. Cognitive psychologists believe that experimenters can "authorize" inequality
to which subjects consent even though they do not think it fair or just. See M. Zelditch, W. Harris,
G. Thomas, & H. Walker, Decisions, Nondecisions, and Metadecisions (Technical Report No.
78)(Stanford Laboratory for Social Research)(1981), discussed in Cohen, Power and Justice in Intergroup Relations, in JUSTICE, supra, at 65.
For a recent case study in the development of working class rejection of ideas of private property,
see Lynd, The Genesis of the Idea of a Community Right to IndustrialProperty in Youngstown and
Pittsburgh, 1977-87, 74 J. AM. Hisr. 926 (1987).
225. Martin, supra note 224, at 330.
226. Id. at 331-33.
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tional, no one would ever join a union in preference to free-riding.2 27 But
workers do join unions and are not irrational to do so.22 The "logic of
collective action" however is simply not captured by simple appeals to
economic benefit. 2 9 Rather, for the union to exist as an organization, it
too must provide a steady stream of motivating symbols and images of a
particular type: enough better than the status quo so as to motivate action; but not so utopian as to lose that motivational quality.2 30 And since
union abilities to communicate with potential members are limited, legislation or other state communication may serve the union's organizational
purposes.23 1
Under the right circumstances, then, labor legislation which is moderately more attractive than the status quo and rich in motivating symbolism can serve both the motivational needs of employers and the
organizational needs of unions. But how can this be true if (as I argued)
workers in industrial countries do not share many beliefs with employers
and if (as I argued) legal institutions are rarely effective in altering
227. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
228. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
229.

Offe & Wiesenthal, Two Logics of CollectiveAction, in C. OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITAL-

ISM: CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF WORK AND POLITICS 170, 183-84 (1985):

[W]orkers' organizations in capitalist systems always find themselves forced to rely upon
non-utilitarian forms of collective action, which are based on the redefinition of collective identities, even if the organization does not have any intention of serving anything
but the members' individual utilitarian interests, for example, higher wages. No union
can function for a day in the absence of some rudimentary notions held by the members
that being a member is of value in itself, that the individual organization costs must not
be calculated in a utilitarian manner but have to be legitimately required to practise
solidarity and discipline, and other norms of an non-utilitarian kind. The logic of collective action of the relatively powerless differs from that of the relatively powerful in that
the former implies a paradox that is absent from the latter-the paradox that interests
can only be met to the extent they are partly redefined.
230. A careful study is Klandermans, Mobilization and Participation:Social-PsychogicalExpansions of Resource Mobilization Theory, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 583 (1984), documenting through repeated
interviews the increasing commitment of Dutch union members to a particular course of action.
Group solidarity and perceived external threat built action where the sort of incentives which
Mancur Olson is interested in were absent.
For a trenchant analysis of "il
sindacato dell'immagine":a union which creates symbolic images
through which it maintains support, see B. MANGHI, DECLINARE CRESCENDO 23-46 (1977). For a
discussion of the impossibility of formal modeling of union bargaining behavior without substantial
reliance on the motivating power of social norms, see J. ELSTER, supra note 156. For a detailed
comparative study of unions' invocation of norms of equality and the like to motivate members, see
P. SWENSON, supra note 92.
231. The most famous example in U.S. labor history is the "The President wants you to join the
union" campaign of the United Mine Workers in 1933, where "President" was thought to mean
Roosevelt. I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS 41 (1969).
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belief?2 32
The short answer is that legislation is used, somewhat abnormally,
to create a "ritual" or "social drama." These concepts have been developed in the anthropological literature precisely to capture the phenomenon of people acting together and thereby creating a functioning
community without any necessary convergence of belief.
The classic theory is Durkheim's, in which shared rituals particularly in occupational groups, and especially in "advanced" cultures in
which "mechanical" solidarity on the basis of shared values was no
longer available, could nevertheless build a different kind of "organic"
solidarity.2 33 People acting together in a ritual can create a community
which would fall apart if people had to confront their diverse interpreta232. I have not been able to recast this study into the extraordinarily powerful vocabulary of
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L.REv. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter TranscendentalNonsense]. Perhaps the labor statutes discussed here could be analyzed as parts of idealized cognitive models as Winter uses the term, id. at
1152. At some points, Winter seems to use the vocabulary of cognitive psychology to suggest that
certain undesirable legal norms remain in force because of their deep psychological resonance with
ingrained social narratives, e.g., Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1458 (1988)(the obfuscatory power of metaphor). In this usage, it is
not easy to figure out how one would engage in unmediated, undistorted communication, or how
Winter, a well-socialized member of our culture, has been able to transcend its cognitive "distortions."
Later articles make clear that Winter does not use the language of cognitive psychology to suggest
that legal ways of thinking are static. He is expressly interested in self-conscious attempts to change
dominant cognitive models through legal argument. See TranscendentalNonsense, supra,at 1224-37;
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Cognitive Dimension]. Winter has provided us with a rich
taxonomy of legal metaphors. Presumably this will be helpful in constructing theories of the relationship between these distinctively legal metaphors and broader social discourse. The latter task remains, however, as Winter recognizes, see, eg., Cognitive Dimension, supra, at 2254 n.99.
233. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (Simpson trans. 1933) (originally.
published in 1893); E. DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIoUs LIFE (Swain
trans. 1915). "The genius of Durkheim's theory of ritual is that it articulates a psychologically
grounded theory of individual needs with a sociologically grounded theory of social requirements."
D. KERTZER, supra note 13, at 63.
Durkheim of course wrote about law, but not as ritual or as any independent shaper of solidarity.
Rather law, specifically the ratio of "repressive" to "restitutionary" (facilitative) law, is used as an
index of the level of solidarity attained by society. In so doing, he and his followers "slighted the
importance of conflict: between moral principles, between laws, and ... between legal and moral
rules." Vogt, Obligationand Right: The Durkheimiansand the Sociology of Law, in THE SOCIOLOGICAL DOMAIN: THE DURKHEIMIANS AND THE FOUNDING OF FRENCH SOCIOLOGY 184 (P. Besnard
ed. 1983), as quoted in Introduction, DURKHEIM AND THE LAw 6 (S. Lukes & A. Scull eds. 1983).
In this Article I follow Durkheim in his account of how ritual can create a sort of solidarity despite
differences in values; as applied to industrial relations it is clear, I hope, that the solidarity created is
at best temporary, negotiated, revisable. See infra note 241.
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tions of the ritual.2 34
Can legal institutions or processes be rituals in this sense? No doubt
the processes are not well understood, and further attention to them will
refine these tentative suggestions. Under the right circumstances, by
which I mean to include some social crisis in the sense of the waning
power of traditional patterns, and some added elements of social drama
to heighten what would otherwise be the low salience and effect of law,
they can.235
Consider a recent study of the Lit de Justice, the ceremonial appearance of the king in early modem France.2 3 6 The ceremonies articulated,
in symbolic form, fundamental principles of French constitutional jurisprudence: separation of powers, the king as spouse of the kingdom unable to alienate its dowry, principles of dynastic succession-"decades
234. Fernandez, Symbolic Consensus in a Fang Reformative Cult, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
902, 923 (1965), is a particularly well-worked-out example.
There is a misleading tendency to think of a person's 'beliefs' as if they were so many
equivalent objects residing in his or her mind, and so well-formed, salient, harmonious,
and meaningful opinions are assigned to individuals whose thoughts on the subject are
ill-defined, logically incompatible, or of no necessary importance to them. The strength
of political organizations comes less from any homogeneity of their members' beliefs
than from the continuing expressions of allegiance through ritual. Thus, ritual can promote social solidarity without implying that people share the same values, or even the
same interpretation of the ritual.
D. KERTZER, supra note 13, at 68.
235. The concept of "social drama" comes from V. TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION INHUMAN SOCIETY 35-44 (1974). The concept definitely includes legal
institutions, id. at 37, and is most suggestive in this context. Social dramas "are units of aharmonic
or disharmonic process, arising in conflict situations. Typically, they have four main phases of public
action, accessible to observation":
1. Breach of regular, norm-governed relations.
2. Crisis. Will the breach be sealed off or widen "until it becomes coextensive with some dominant cleavage in the widest set of social relations to which the conflicting or antagonistic parties
belong?" Id. at 38. "This second stage, crisis, is always one of those turning points or moments of
danger or suspense, when a true state of affairs is revealed, when it is least easy to don masks or
pretend that there is nothing rotten in the village." Id. at 39.
3. Redressive action by the leaders of society. "It is in the redressive phase that both pragmatic
techniques and symbolic action reach their fullest expression." Id. at 41.
4. The final phase "consists either of the reintegration of the disturbed social group or of the
social recognition and legitimization of irreparable schism between the contesting parties. .. "Id. at
41.
Labor legislation is presumably the furthest thing from Turner's mind, but isn't the fit remarkable? Turner's pattern of social drama applies to nearly every recent example of the adoption of labor
legislation which I can find.
236. Hanley, Legend, Ritual, andDiscourse in the Lit de JusticeAssembly: French Constitutional
Ideology, 1527-1641, in RITEs OF POWER: SYMBOLIsM, RITUAL, AND POLITICS SINCE THE MIDDLE

AGES 65 (S. Wilentz ed. 1985). The whole volume is full of suggestive parallels for the student of
contemporary law.
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before such precepts were discussed in the writings of theorists."2'37
This all suggests-it hardly demonstrates-the following model of
labor legislation, seen as "social drama":
1. Labor legislation responds to social crisis, including both:
a. Increased unrest and conflict, and
b. general sense that established patterns of interaction are inadequate to provide a basis for continuing life.
2. Labor legislation is substantially framed by social leaders who
feel compelled to respond to crisis.
3. Labor legislation is a symbolic picture of a slightly idealized vision of the society's labor relations. The "position" of working people in
the society is reaffirmed as central, just as surely as the Lit de Justice
depicted the "position" of the King or Parliament.
4. Labor legislation is welcomed by the formal organizations representing working people, typically unions, as the appropriate culmination of the unrest. Images of the organizational "place" of unions, the
"rights" of workers, the "concessions" by employers can serve the
union's organizational needs in building solidarity and mobilizing action.
5. THE ULTIMATE IMPACT OF SUCH SYMBOLIC ACTION IS NEVER DETERMINATE; IT REMAINS TO BE
WORKED OUT IN EACH CASE. Unrest may be quieted, or it may
accelerate. Workers may accept temporary integration into "normal"
political or administrative life, or may reject it. Labor legislation is not
"symbolic" as opposed to "behavioral," or because unions cannot get
anything better.23 Labor legislation is symbolic because it cannot help
being symbolic. Nobody would know where to go to work in the morning
or how to behave once they got there without a store of cultural symbols
describing how this works, and while many cultural forces converge to
produce this symbolic message, on rare occasions, law does too.
C. Objections to the Interpretive Model of Labor Legislation
It will be objected that this account is necessarily a conservative one
which overplays cultural continuity and cohesion and downplays fluidity
and change. This criticism includes several distinct charges, some of
237. Id. at 74.
238. Of course in individual cases an observer could conclude that a union settled for a weak
symbolic change when it might have achieved a more significant structural or economic change. But
the determination can't be made in general. Moreover, in my opinion, the long-run impact of symbolic legislation is so poorly understood as to diminish any confidence in one's ability to make comparisons of this kind.
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which are truer than others.23 9

It is certainly true as a matter of the internal history of this article
that it was born in frustration at the tenacity of social institutions to
resist change-in my case, the political blockages which seemed in 1977
to render impossible even modest labor legislation. And, as happens so

often in the historiography of the world, frustration gives rise to cultural
explanations. Problems seem intractable, politics seems blocked, progress
seems thwarted; things are worse than we feared; surely some deep cultural explanation is needed. 24° True, but so what? The issue is understanding the processes of change in labor law, not what led the researcher
to study them, and if "cultural" factors figure in the best story we can

tell, then so much the worse for our preconceptions.
A more telling charge of conservatism would assert some link be-

tween my use of Durkheim's concept of ritual and Durkheim's own
heavy emphasis on system-maintenance and integration. This is a somewhat necessitarian argument for the link is not inevitable, and is successfully avoided by many contemporary anthropologists who study ritual.
For the interpretation above is about nothing but change: the change in
patterns of strikes and quiescence; the shifting demands of workers; the

negotiation of symbols; the search for the new symbolic representation of
power. We construct our symbols incrementally, building on what we
241
know; but we do the constructing.
239. For example, who among us could confidently assert that his or her theory escapes the
charge of necessitarianism, as made against much of the world's thought in R. UNGER, SOCIAL
THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK (1987)? I certainly have tried to treat society as artifact not
natural, have focussed on moments of context smashing not forming routines, but does any or all of
this meet Professor Unger's daunting requirements? B. FAY, supra note 216, is considerably more
lucid on the subject of critical social science, and vastly less paralyzing.
240. These themes are explored in G. HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN
THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE 369-70 (1984)(with respect to "cultural" explanations of poverty).
The rediscovery of English cultural resistance to labor law, see supra notes 164-68, similarly followed
the disillusion of the failed 1971 reform, a disillusion felt even by those who detested the particular
values that legislation endeavored to enact. Much of the recent American historical work on "working class culture" reflects similar political disillusion.
241. In trying to bury the naive notion that politics is simply the outcome of different
interest groups competing for material resources, I want to avoid the opposite fallacy,
that of portraying people as zombies imprisoned in a symbolically created universe they
are powerless to change. The fact that symbols and rites are crucial to politics does not
mean that people simply view the world in the way their culture and its guiding myths
dictate. What is crucial, though, is the fact that power must be expressed through symbolic guises.
D. KERTZER, supra note 13, at 174.
Arnold van Gennep "insisted that in all ritualized movement there was at least a moment when
those being moved in accordance with a cultural script were liberated from normative demands,
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Finally, a more philosophic criticism asserts that an interpretation
cannot ever be a criticism because it at most describes the status quo. 42
There are weighty ontological issues here, well-known to devotees of the
literature of hermeneutic philosophy, which I shall pass over. The goal of
the interpretation which I have advanced here surpasses criticism, approaches activism. For the truth of this interpretation will be if the activist comes to understand and then pursue the fight for control of
cultural symbols; if the legal scholar comes to understand and then pursue the complex symbolic ramifications of our most ordinary daily lawmaking activity. As I said above, the validity of a critical interpretation
lies in its acceptability to the object of interpretation. At this point, you,
the reader, must decide the validity of my interpretation of the practice
of legal scholarship, if not legislation. In this sense, the truth of the theory of labor legislation is not for me to know.
CONCLUSION

While scholars employ no generally-recognized general theory of labor law, most ordinary scholarship operates from an implicit theory
under which labor law changes result from altered ideological consensus
among union, management, and government leaders, who implement legislative change in order to bring about desired changes in management
and union behavior. This implict model of labor law in turn orients research towards these (generally illusory) changes in behavior.
Recently this model has been challenged, particularly within the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, by models which see labor law as a
legitimating ideology. While full of insights, including attention to ideas,
these models seem inconsistent with much of what we know about the
relationship between law and behavior.
This Article has presented a model of labor legislation which is true
to observable reality and predicts the timing, doctrinal content, and impact of labor law changes. The model raises more questions than it anwhen they were, indeed, betwixt and between successive lodgments in jural political systems. In this
gap between ordered worlds almost anything may happen." V. TURNER, supra note 235, at 13.
Participants in some of the strikes described supra Part III use similar vocabulary to describe the
feeling that "anything was possible". See Zolberg, Moments of Madness, 2 POL. & Soc'Y 183 (1972).
242. The criticism is found in, inter alia, Lukes, On the Social Determination of Truth, in
MODES OF THOUGHT: ESSAYS ON THINKING IN WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN SOCIETIES 230 (R.
Horton & R. Finnegan eds. 1973), and B. FAY, SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICAL PRACTICE 90-91
(1975), and is disputed, largely through adduced counterexamples, in M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 28-66 (1987). I read Fay as later abandoning this criticism in B. FAY,
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: LIBERATION AND ITS LIMITS (1987).
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swers, but some of the questions have the virtue of being unorthodox. It
appears that, under the right circumstances, working class pressure can
be effective in achieving legislation. Proper subjects for research remain
the symbolic impact of such legislation; cultural differences in the legislative process in labor law; the function of the rhetoric of rights in labor
legislation; actual interpretations of labor law by working people; and
explanations for the apparent deviance of the United States from some
aspects of the model of labor legislation.
Yet while legal scholars study these questions, working people will
continue to try to achieve justice through law. They want to know
whether they can achieve anything through such struggles. While ultimately they, not we, must answer that question, we can, at least, begin to
ask it.

